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ABSTRACT 
Organizational reputation has been shown to influence important organizational 
outcomes. As a result, a large body of literature has devoted significant attention to 
organizational reputation. Findings have shown organizational reputation influences a 
wide range of outcomes such as IPO pricing, firm performance, stakeholder support, and 
organizational misconduct. One area extant organizational reputation work has not 
examined is the influence of organizational reputation on strategic decision making. In 
this dissertation, I propose organizational reputation is an important factor influencing 
strategic decision making. I draw on recent refinements of the known for something 
dimension of organizational reputation and focus on firms with a high firm innovation 
capability reputation. Firms with a high innovation capability reputation are known for 
generating innovation.  
 Innovation is expected from firms with a high innovation capability reputation, 
but less attention is given to the behaviors or actions these firms engage in to generate 
innovation. Recognizing stakeholders largely focus on the firm’s innovation leads CEOs 
to perceive discretion exists in the behaviors the firm can use to generate innovation. I 
examine how having a high innovation capability reputation and the areas of discretion 
CEOs perceive attached to the reputation influence strategic distinctiveness. Why some 
firms increase distinctiveness while others reduce distinctiveness is a central question for 
organizational scholars. I develop competing hypotheses suggesting an upside and 
downside to strategic distinctiveness exists influencing the likelihood of engaging in 
strategic distinctiveness. On the upside, strategic distinctiveness offers firms a 
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mechanism to help achieve aspirations. One the downside, strategic distinctiveness 
offers a mechanism that could result in the firm losing the benefits its reputation offers. 
To examine boundary conditions, I draw on the upper echelons literature and argue 
organizational, environmental, and leadership contexts can create contingencies 
exacerbating aspirations or loss aversion that will either amplify or attenuate my main 
relationships. Finally, literature suggests firms walk a fine line between too much 
distinctiveness and not enough distinctiveness. Thus, I examine whether an optimal level 
of strategic distinctiveness is best for firm performance. I test my arguments using a 
sample of S&P 1500 firms between 2007-2015. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizational reputation matters for firms because it influences organizational 
outcomes (Ravasi, Rindova, Etter, & Cornelissen, 2018). Accordingly, scholars have 
devoted significant attention to understanding organizational reputation focusing both on 
the antecedents and outcomes of the construct (Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011; Ravasi et al., 
2018). A variety of factors influence the formation of a focal organization’s reputation 
including performance, competitive actions, affiliations, institutional intermediaries, 
social activism, social media, and industry membership (Etter, Ravasi, & Colleoni, 2019; 
Ravasi et al., 2018). Extant research shows having a positive reputation generates 
favorable organizational outcomes like firm performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), 
price premiums customers are willing to pay for products (Rindova, Williamson, 
Petkova, & Sever, 2005), exchange partner relationships (Park & Rogan, 2019), 
shareholder value (Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015), and survival (Rao, 1994). 
 Research on organizational reputation continues to grow in importance both 
pragmatically and theoretically. Pragmatically, changes in society like the advent of 
social media make reputation an increasingly important asset organizations value and 
analyze. Theoretically, the rise of social media empowers individuals to shape 
perceptions of organizations something extant research largely ignores (Etter et al., 
2018). The increasing importance of reputation and its ability to change quickly in 
today’s social media obsessed environment suggests reputation likely manifests in 
organizations’ strategic decision making. Yet, how organizational reputation manifests 
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in strategic decision making has received considerably less attention from scholars. 
Despite this, recent conceptualizations of organizational reputation suggest reputation 
may impact strategic decision making and, as a result, organizational performance 
(Parker, Krause, & Devers, 2019; Park & Rogan, 2019). 
Parker and colleagues (2019) refine organizations that have a reputation for 
something into behavior-based and outcome-based reputations. The conceptualization 
builds from earlier work by Mishina and colleagues (2012) who identified organizations 
as being known for character or capability reasons. The behavior-based and outcome-
based conceptualization is inclusive to the earlier conceptualization by Mishina and 
colleagues (2012), while simultaneously acknowledging a wider range of factors beyond 
character might lead to developing a behavior-based reputation as well as factors other 
than capability may generate an outcome-based reputation. In addition to offering a 
refinement to what organizations are known for, the authors draw attention to how an 
organization’s reputation generates areas of perceived discretion. Executives in 
organizations with behavior-based reputations have to deliver the same actions expected 
by stakeholders but perceive discretion in the objectives or outcomes the organization 
can pursue. Contrastingly, executives in organizations with outcome-based reputations 
must achieve the outcome stakeholders expect, but perceive discretion in the actions they 
can use to achieve the outcome (Parker et al., 2019). Hence, organizations face pressures 
from stakeholders to maintain a high reputation, but areas of perceived discretion do 
exist. 
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 Using the recent refinement by Parker and colleagues (2019) can offer us a better 
understanding of how organizations can maintain a high reputation. An organization 
faces pressures to conform to stakeholders’ expectations, but at the same time needs to 
differentiate enough from peer organizations to distinguish the organization (Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Areas of perceived discretion offer managers one 
way to be able to differentiate the organization from other similar organizations. 
Exploiting areas of perceived discretion enables an organization to develop distinct 
strategies relative to its peer organizations, strategic distinctiveness, allowing the 
organization to stand out. The type of reputation an organization possesses shapes how 
and why an organization engages in strategic distinctiveness. Thus, this suggests 
attention needs to be given to how organizational reputation influences important 
strategic decisions such as how relatively distinct the organization should be, which is a 
fundamental question facing all organizations (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 
2014). 
To address this research question, I examine how an organization’s outcome-
based reputation influences differences in a firm’s strategic distinctiveness relative to 
other organizations. Specifically, I focus on organizations with an innovation capability 
that leads these organizations to be known for innovation, which is an outcome. I 
develop competing hypotheses given extant literature provides no clear guidance. On 
one hand, scholars suggest an upside to strategic distinctiveness exists because it offers 
firms with a high firm innovation capability reputation a mechanism to achieve 
aspirations (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010; Haleblian, Pfarrer, & Kiley, 
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2017). On the other hand, scholars suggest a downside to strategic distinctiveness exists 
because it offers firms a mechanism that could result in the firm losing the benefits its 
reputation offers (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Mishina et al., 2010). Hence, I develop competing 
hypotheses arguing aspirations increase the likelihood of engaging in strategic 
distinctiveness, while loss aversion decreases the likelihood of engaging in strategic 
distinctiveness.  
Upper echelons research shows managerial decision making is dependent on 
context (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
Specifically, upper echelon scholars argue contingencies in organizational, 
environmental, and leadership contexts can have important effects on managerial 
decision making. Thus, I examine how contingencies in each context can create demands 
that either amplify or attenuate the likelihood that a firm with a high innovation 
reputation engages in strategic distinctiveness. I focus on factors shaping demands in 
each context because extant upper echelons research illustrates the demands managers 
experience act as a salient force shaping decision making (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & 
Mooney, 2005).  For each context, I chose a salient factor extant research has identified 
as a demand that could exacerbate aspirations or loss aversion. In the organizational 
context, I examine organizational prominence given research shows prominence creates 
demands on organizations (Rindova et al., 2005; Mishina et al., 2010; Haleblian et al., 
2010). In the environmental context, I examine environmental dynamism because extant 
research shows environmental dynamism places demands on firms shaping strategic 
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decision making (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Henderson, Miller, Hambrick, 2006; 
Jansen, Vera, Crossan, 2009). In the leadership context, I examine CEO ideology 
because research illustrates CEO ideology shapes aspirations and loss aversion 
influencing strategic decision making (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Chin, 
Hambrick & Trevino, 2013; Elnahas & Kim, 2017). Finally, I examine how strategic 
distinctiveness influences organizational performance to better understand whether an 
optimal level of distinctiveness exists for organizations with an outcome-based 
reputation. 
 This dissertation offers several contributions. First, by examining the influence of 
an organization’s outcome-based reputation on strategic distinctiveness I contribute to 
the organizational reputation literature (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Specifically, I draw 
attention to an important factor that influences important strategic decisions that extant 
work has yet to examine. Second, I contribute to the organizational reputation and 
strategic leadership literatures by testing how an organization’s outcome-based 
reputation influences strategic decisions at the executive level. Only a single study has 
examined an organization’s outcome-based reputation and this work focused on 
stakeholders (exchange partners) rather than executives (Park & Rogan, 2019). Hence, I 
complement and contribute to a growing body of literature showing the importance of an 
organization’s reputation in important organizational actions. Third, I contribute to the 
organizational reputation literature by drawing attention to the level of distinctiveness as 
important mediating factor influencing the effects of reputation. Extant work has shown 
high organizational reputation influences CEO decisions (Mishina et al, 2010), but this 
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work is too narrow in its consideration of the decisions high reputation might impact. 
Considering the level of distinctiveness across a range of actions can better help us 
understand when and why high firm reputation generates favorable organizational 
outcomes. Finally, I introduce a measure of innovation capability that future research on 
organizational reputation can utilize to study the antecedents and consequences of an 
outcome-based reputation. 
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
To address my research question I draw on three streams of literature: 
organizational reputation, upper echelons, and strategic distinctiveness. Each of these 
literatures reflect a central construct in my dissertation. To simplify my literature review 
I break the section into three subparts. First, I review the organizational reputation 
literature because my central variable of interest reflects a type of reputation. Second, I 
review the upper echelons literature on context as a contingency factor influencing 
managerial effects. Finally, I review the strategic novelty literature.  My central variable 
of interest, an organization’s outcome-based reputation, is a type of organizational 
reputation and, thus, I begin by reviewing the organizational reputation literature below. 
Organizational Reputation 
Organizational reputation is an important factor influencing organizations 
because it impacts organizational outcomes (Ravasi et al., 2018). Given the importance 
of organizational reputation, it has drawn considerable scholarly attention. A downside 
of this attention has been a lack of construct clarity. A recent review by Ravasi and 
colleagues (2018) highlights six different perspectives on organizational reputation exist. 
Each perspective defines organizational reputation slightly differently. Although no 
consensus definition exists (Ravasi et al., 2018), organizational reputation generally is 
defined as “a collective social judgement regarding the quality or capabilities of a focal 
actor within a specific domain” (Boivie, Graffiin, & Gentry, 2016: 188; Park & Rogan, 
2019).   Three main dimensions of organizational reputation exist. Lange and colleagues 
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(2011) in trying to provide construct clarity, refine organizational reputation into being 
known (generalized awareness or visibility of the firm; prominence of the firm in the 
collective perception), being known for something (perceived predictability of 
organizational outcomes and behavior relevant to specific audience interests), and 
generalized favorability (perceptions or judgements of the overall organization as good, 
attractive, and appropriate) (155). Rather than focusing on converging on a single 
definition scholars have begun to focus on investigating the different dimensions of 
organizational reputation (Boivie et al., 2016; Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Park & Rogan, 
2019; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007).  Below I describe each of the three dimensions 
starting first with the being known for something dimension. 
Being Known for Something: Outcomes and Behaviors 
 The difference between the being known and being known for something 
dimension is judgement.  Judgement acts as a central factor influencing stakeholders’ 
perceptions of organizations. Stakeholders judge whether the organization can deliver or 
meet specific needs or provide value. Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) refer to this 
dimension as the result of judgements with respect to “the firm’s demonstrated ability to 
create value”. Love and Kraatz (2009: 317) label this dimension of reputation as 
“technical efficacy” reflecting judgements by an audience of the firm regarding whether 
the organization can meet material needs. Basedo and colleagues (2006) refer to this 
dimension of organizational reputation when stating organizational reputation reflects 
stakeholders’ collective judgements of the firm’s disposition to behave in a certain 
manner.  
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Evaluations can focus on either the material outcomes of an organization or the 
organization’s behavior and will vary across audiences (Love & Kraatz, 2009). Lange 
and colleagues (2011) cite Mahon (2002) who nicely summarizes the being known for 
something dimension. Mahon (2002: 439) states that “reputation is an asset in relation to 
(a) a specific context or process, (b) a specific issue, (c) specific stakeholders, and (d) 
expectations of organizational behavior based on past actions and situations.  
Research shows being known for something impacts organizational outcomes. 
Benjamin and Podolny (1999) study how California wine makers past quality provides 
information about current quality reflecting the wine makers reputation. Results show 
reputation has beneficial impacts on organizational status. Rindova and Fombrun (1999) 
illustrate how competitive advantage depends on the interactions among firms and 
constituents whereby information regarding the performance of firms is shaped. The 
interactive process firms and constituents engage in shapes access to resources and 
competitive advantage. Rhee and Haunschild (2006) find organizations with a high 
reputation reflecting consumers’ perceptions of the superior quality of the organization 
experience higher market penalties for product recalls. Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) 
refer to reputation as an accumulation of high levels of public recognition of the quality 
of a firm’s capabilities and outputs. Using this definition of reputation, the authors show 
high reputation firms are less likely to announce earnings surprises. Further, high 
reputation firms receive smaller penalties for negative surprises and larger rewards for 
positive surprises. 
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 Love and Kraatz (2009) show downsizing decisions by corporations influence 
the character dimension. Specifically, corporations choosing to downsize experience 
negative character perceptions that depend on the overall prevalence of downsizing 
among firms. Basdeo and colleagues (2006) highlight how a firm behaves in the market 
influences reputation. The authors find the total number of a firm’s market actions, 
complexity of its action repertoire, time lags in rivals’ responses, and similarity of its 
repertoire with rivals positively influence reputation. 
Since Lange and colleagues (2011) review of the organizational reputation 
literature refinements of the being known for something dimension have occurred. 
Mishina and colleagues (2012) building from extant work introduce two dimensions of 
being known for something: capability and character. Capability reputations refer to 
collective evaluations about the quality and performance characteristics of a particular 
firm. Character reputations refer to collective judgements regarding a firm’s incentive 
structures and behavioral tendencies, based on observations of the firm’s prior actions. 
Capability reputations assess what the firm can do, while character reputations assess 
what the firm would likely do. 
Parker and colleagues (2019) offer a further refinement to the being known for 
something dimension which encapsulates the earlier refinement by Mishina and 
colleagues (2012). Parker and colleagues (2019) introduce two dimensions of being 
known for something: behaviors and outcome.  Behavior based reputations reflect 
observations of the firm’s behavioral tendencies and past actions allowing observers to 
reliably predict which actions the firm will take in the future. Outcome based reputations 
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reflect observations about the firm’s quality and performance characteristics allowing 
observers to reliably predict which outcomes the firm is likely to achieve. The authors 
argue the terms act as meta constructs whereby being known for something reputations 
can be assigned to one of the two dimensions. Further, the behavior and outcome based 
conceptualization is more inclusive than Mishina and colleagues (2012) capability and 
character conceptualization. 
 Parker and colleagues (2019) discuss how being known for something creates 
areas of perceived discretion as well. Organizations with a behavior-based reputation 
must continue to behave in the same way, but perceive discretion in the objectives that 
can be pursued (Parker et al., 2019). Organizations with an outcome-based reputation 
need to deliver the outcome stakeholders expect, but executives’ perceive discretion in 
the actions that can be taken to achieve the outcome (Parker et al., 2019). Given the 
recent nature of the new conceptualization limited empirical work exists. In fact, no 
studies using the behavior-based or outcome-based terminology exist. However, as the 
authors contend in the new conceptualization, behaviors encapsulate character and 
outcomes encapsulate capability. The study by Park and Rogan (2019) adds support to 
this perspective even though it is not a direct test of it. Park and Rogan (2019) analyze 
how an organization’s character and capability reputations influence exchange partners 
likelihood of partnering with the organization (potential new exchange partner) or 
remaining with the organization (existing exchange partner) following adverse events. 
The authors find a capability reputation is more important to potential exchange partners, 
while existing exchange partners focus more on character reputations. This work shows 
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an organization’s type of reputation has important outcomes for organizational actions 
supporting the notion it might matter in strategic decision making. 
Being Known: Organizational Prominence 
 Another salient dimension of reputation is the being known dimension. Scholars 
often refer to being known as organizational prominence and I will follow extant 
approaches and refer to it as prominence (Rindova et al., 2005). The term prominence 
comes from the institutional perspective on reputation. The institutional perspective 
believes that uncertainty on organizations is reduced through social interactions among 
actors that helps to diffuse the “true” attributes of a firm (Rindova et al., 2005). Within 
an organizational field certain actors like institutional intermediaries and high status 
actors are uniquely located to access and/or disseminate information (Rao, 1998; Rao, 
Greve, & Davis, 2001; Rindova et al., 2005). Due to the unique information institutional 
intermediaries and high status actors can possess stakeholders pay close attention to the 
information these actors provide on organizations. As a result, differences in the 
information institutional intermediaries and high status actors provide on certain 
organizations influences how salient or central the organization is in the public mind 
(Rindova et al., 2005). 
 Extant work has focused both on the antecedents and outcomes of prominence. 
As alluded to above, institutional intermediaries and high status actors are two important 
antecedents to prominence. Specifically, rankings or certifications by institutional 
intermediaries like the media lead to prominence (Rindova et al., 2005). Associating 
with high status actors is another important antecedent of prominence (Rindova et al., 
 13 
 
2005). A firm’s market actions impact prominence as well. Basdeo and colleagues 
(2006) find the total number of market actions, the complexity of its action repertoire, 
time lag in rivals responses to its actions, and the similarity of its repertoire with its 
rivals positively affects reputation. 
 Prominence can lead to beneficial firm outcomes. Pollock and Rindova (2003) 
show how media coverage of a firm is positively associated with the firms’ initial public 
offering (IPO). Similarly, Zuckerman (1999) shows coverage by analysts’ influences 
how investors value a firm. Roberts and Dowling (2002) illustrate how having a high 
reputation is positively associated with financial performance. 
 Another steam of research examines how having a high reputation or 
prominence can influence positive and negative organizational outcomes. Specifically, 
this research investigates how prominence can impact firm’s aspirations causing good 
firms to do bad things (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010). Mishina and 
colleagues (2010) link work on loss aversion with organizational reputation to show 
prominent firms’ aspirations to maintain prominence relative to peers causes good firms 
to engage in corporate illegality. Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) find high reputation or 
prominent firms are less likely to announce positive earnings surprises. Further, 
prominent firms receive lower market penalties for negative earnings surprises and 
greater market rewards for earnings surprises. 
 Building from this work, recent research examines the boundary conditions of 
having a high reputation. Zavyalova and colleagues (2016) utilize a sample of 
universities experiencing a negative event to examine when having a high reputation acts 
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as a burden and when it acts as a benefit. The authors find stakeholder identification is 
an important moderator influencing whether a high reputation acts as a burden or 
benefit. High stakeholder identification causes a high reputation to act as a benefit 
following a negative event, while low stakeholder identification causes a high reputation 
to act as a burden. 
 Collectively, research shows an organization’s recognition among stakeholders 
and ability to stand out relative to peers in its organizational field is important. 
Generalized Favorability: Expectancy violations and favorability shocks 
 The final dimension of organizational reputation is generalized favorability. 
Generalized favorability refers to the overall perception of the organization as being 
good, attractive, and appropriate. Scholars tend to focus on the tone stakeholders use to 
describe the organization to capture generalized favorability (Lange et al., 2011). More 
positive tones reflect a higher generalized favorability for the organization. 
Organizations with high generalized favorability tend to be in stakeholders’ minds more 
as well as exist in a positive way. As a result, this can lead to favorable organizational 
outcomes (Ravasi et al., 2018). 
When an event violates stakeholders’ expectations of the organization this 
impacts the organization’s generalized favorability. Stakeholders will not look as 
favorability on the organization because the organization did not do what was expected. 
Events that violate stakeholders’ expectations are referred to as expectancy violations. 
Extant research illustrates expectancy violations influence strategic decision making. 
Bednar and colleagues (2013) show negative events cause organizations to engage in 
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strategic change. Harrison and colleagues (2018) illustrate how organizations receiving 
star analyst downgrades and negative attention because of violating expectations leads 
directors to leave firms as a means of reputation maintenance. Bednar and colleagues 
(2015) show how the potential negative influence of controversial governance practices 
is contingent on media coverage and acceptance of the practices. This work illustrates 
generalized favorability is highly context dependent. 
Research shows firms’ actions and industry dynamics impact generalized 
favorability as well. Recent work shows CEOs’ media coverage can impact 
organizational reputation. Love and colleagues (2017) find CEO’s who receive negative 
media coverage damage their firm’s reputation. Firms with higher levels of wrongdoing 
experience lower generalized favorability (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). 
This is magnified if other firms in the industry experience wrongdoing creating a 
negative spillover effect. However, firms can engage in technical actions to offset the 
negative effect of their wrongdoing. Graffin and colleagues (2016) show firms can use 
impression offsetting to moderate the negative reaction from an expectancy violation. 
The authors find organizations can use positive unrelated information to offset the 
negative reaction to an expectancy violating acquisition (Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 
2016). 
 The term expectancy reflects the fact stakeholders expect actors to conform to 
the “enduring pattern of actions” associated with specific situations (Burgoon, 1993). 
Expectancies are classified into two types: prescriptive and predictive. Prescriptive 
expectancies refer to generalized norms for a specific outcome (Burgoon, 1993). 
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Predictive expectancies refer to anticipated outcomes for specific actors or specific 
situations (Burgoon, 1993; Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016). To illustrate, firms with a 
high firm outcome-based reputation have predictive expectancies to deliver the outcome 
associated with the firm’s reputation. Prescriptive expectancies reflect collective 
perceptions about the normal actions firms with a specific high firm outcome-based 
reputation, like innovation, take to generate the outcome. For example, high research and 
development expenditures may be perceived as normal actions taken to generate 
innovation. When actors act consistent with expectancies little new information is 
provided and stakeholders are satisfied. 
 If an actor violates expectancies, it results in an expectancy violation directing 
stakeholders’ attention to the actor and the violation (Burgoon, 1993; Graffin et al., 
2016). Expectancy violations can be positive or negative. Positive expectancy violations 
would be actors exceeding stakeholders’ expectations in a situation. Negative 
expectancy violations would be an actor not meeting expectations by not acting in the 
expected way. To illustrate, a firm exceeding its earnings estimate is a positive 
expectancy violation, while a firm missing its earnings estimate is negative expectancy 
violation (Graffin et al., 2016). 
 The level of perceived intentionality magnifies the impact of an expectancy 
violation. Stakeholders feel more violated when they perceive the firm intentionally 
violated the trust placed in the organization (Burgoon, 1993; Graffin et al., 2016). 
Having a reputation for a specific outcome establishes a connection between 
stakeholders and an organization (Parker et al., 2019). Stakeholders trust the 
 17 
 
organization will deliver the outcome and engage in practices to do so. When an 
organization with an outcome-based violation has an expectancy violation on delivering 
its outcome it will break the trust stakeholders placed in the organization. Stakeholders 
will perceive the organization intentionally deviated from what it is known for which 
will magnify the impact of the expectancy violation. Contrastingly, violations the 
organization is not known for will not create the same impact because no trust has been 
established between the stakeholder and organization. Nor is there a pattern of actions to 
validate stakeholders’ perceptions of the organization intentionally acting differently. 
 When an expectancy violation occurs it brings increased scrutiny to actors 
(Burgoon, 1993). Meeting expectations allows the actor more discretion to go about its 
business without interference. After the expectancy violation, stakeholders will examine 
all the actions actors take and more pressure will be on actors to conform to 
expectations. The nature of the action causing the violation influences the level of 
scrutiny. Organizations with a reputation have expectations that must be met in the eyes 
of stakeholders.  If an organization engages in actions that violate its reputation, it will 
create a magnified expectancy violation. As a result, it will create a situation where 
stakeholders place high scrutiny and pressure on organizations to conform to 
expectations again or risk losing the firm’s reputation. 
The Role of Context as a Contingency: Organizational, Environmental, and 
Leadership 
The upper echelons perspective argues executives’ personalities, values, and 
experiences shape their interpretations of the situations they face and, in turn, affect their 
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choices (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). A long line of research originating from the central 
premise of the upper echelons model now exists. This research illustrates individual 
differences among executives influence a wide range of organizational outcomes 
(Carpenter et al., 2004). 
Within the upper echelons literature a specific stream of research exists 
examining the influence of context. Research on context illustrates context is a salient 
factor influencing managerial decision making (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Context acts as a contingency factor influencing managerial effects. This 
means the role of executives’ personalities, values, and experiences in decision making 
is dependent on context. The research on context recognizes three salient contexts 
influencing managerial decision making: organizational, environmental, and leadership 
(Carpenter et al., 2004). The organizational context reflects the internal context of an 
organization including things such as strategy and structure of the organization. 
Environmental context captures the broad environment the organization exists in 
examining factors that can shift stability and change like industry characteristics. 
Leadership context reflects the dynamics of leadership existing among executives in the 
apex of the firm. Below I review the literature on each specific context. 
Organizational Context 
 Research on organizational context acting as a contingency factor focuses 
largely on the strategy and structure of the organization. International diversification has 
been shown to be a salient contingency factor shaping managerial effects. Carpenter 
(2002) shows the relationship between TMT heterogeneity and performance is stronger 
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in firms with higher levels of internationalization. Carpenter and colleagues (2001) find 
TMT work experiences positive relationship with performance in multinational firms 
was stronger in firms with a greater global presence.  Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) show 
internationalization acts as a salient moderator influencing the effect of managerial 
diversity on firm performance. The authors find the influence of managerial diversity on 
firm performance is stronger in highly internationalized firms. 
Extant work illustrates the structure of the organization is another salient 
moderator. Damanpour (1991) shows the type of organization is an important moderator 
influencing the relationship between managerial characteristics and innovation. The 
author finds differences exist between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
organizations as well as for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. Steensma and Corley 
(2001) illustrate organizational context moderates firm boundaries for technology 
sourcing. Specifically, the authors examine three structural factors: managerial 
ownership, risk orientation of the firm, and slack resources. The authors show 
organizational context moderates the likelihood of transactions cost economics, an 
options perspective, and a resource-based view explaining firm boundary decisions. 
Battilana and Casciaro (2012) illustrate change agents ability to generate organizational 
change is moderated by the whether the change diverges from the institutional status quo 
in the organization’s field of activity. This work illustrates the type of strategy is an 
important moderator influencing alterations in organizational structure. 
Research shows organizational scope is another important moderator. Vermeulen 
and Barkema (2002) find the strategic decision to engage in foreign expansion and its 
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positive relationship with firm performance is moderated by scope of 
internationalization. Higher levels of organizational scope during the internationalization 
process negatively moderate a firm’s increase in profitability resulting from international 
expansion. Further, work by Jansen and colleagues (2009) highlights integration 
mechanisms (contingency rewards, social integration, cross-functional interfaces, and 
connectedness) mediate the relationship between structural differentiation and 
ambidexterity. Slater and colleagues (2006) illustrate the strategic orientation of the 
organization moderates the strategy formation capability—performance relationship.  
Organizational size has also been shown to be an important moderator. Vaccaro 
and colleagues (2012) illustrate organizational size moderates the relationship between 
leadership and management innovation (i.e., new practices, processes, or structures) with 
the relationship stronger in smaller firms. Chen and Hambrick (1995) find small firms 
and large firms differ in terms of competitive behavior. The authors find smaller airlines 
were speedier to initiate attacks, but were stealthy in doing so compared to larger 
airlines. Greenwood and colleagues (2010) show firm size moderates downsizing 
decisions. Smaller family owned firms are less likely to downsize compared to larger 
non-family owned firms. Voss and Voss (2013) illustrate organizational size moderates 
the product and market ambidexterity performance relationship. The authors find 
product and market ambidexterity leads to positive effects on revenue in larger but not 
smaller firms. 
Jensen and Zajac (2004) show governance arrangements act as another salient 
contingency factor. Specifically, the authors find the influence of executive background 
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on diversification was dependent on whether the background was embodied in the CEO, 
TMT or the board. Tang and colleagues (2011) show powerful boards moderate the 
likelihood of powerful CEOs engaging in deviant strategies. Dowell and colleagues 
(2011) illustrate CEO power moderates the relationship between governance and 
survival with powerful CEOs being more beneficial during crisis. Research finds 
structural interdependence of TMTs is another important moderating effect influencing 
the relationship between TMT composition and organizational outcomes (Hambrick, 
Humphrey, & Gupta, 2015). Recent work by Misangyi and Acharya (2014) extends 
earlier work on governance arrangements showing the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance is dependent on how the factors are configured. This 
work examines a variety of factors extant upper echelons research shows influence firm 
performance (e.g., CEO ownership, CEO duality, TMT ownership) to illustrate the effect 
of governance mechanisms on firm performance depends on how the factors are 
combined. 
Environmental Context 
 Another contextual factor extant upper echelons research identifies as a 
contingency factor is the environment. Work examining the environment largely focuses 
on how factors within the environment either support stability or change (Carpenter et 
al., 2004). Hoffman and Hegarty (1993) show the effect of TMT characteristics on 
innovation varies by culture. Wiersema and Bird (1993) find TMT heterogeneity led to 
higher levels of turnover among Japanese firms relative to U.S. firms. Geletkanycz 
(1997) demonstrated national culture was an important moderator impacting executives’ 
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preference for the status quo. Crossland and Hambrick (2011) show nation-level 
institutional factors impact the degree to which CEOs matter. The authors find nation-
level factors increasing discretion increase the influence a CEO has on firm 
performance. Van Essen (2012) and colleagues illustrate the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm performance is dependent on country level factors. 
Specifically, the authors find the degree to which formal and informal institutions protect 
investors from managerial opportunism and overcompensation act as salient moderating 
mechanisms. 
 Industry characteristics have drawn significant attention from scholars studying 
the environment. In one of the earliest studies, Keck (1997) found the complexity of the 
environment moderated the influence of TMT heterogeneity and tenure of firm 
performance. In highly complex environments short-tenured teams and heterogeneous 
teams were found to be most valuable. Contrastingly, in stable environments long 
tenured and homogenous teams led to better performance. Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1990) find that the effect of TMT tenure on strategy and performance depends on the 
level of discretion a firm’s industry offers. Specifically, the tendency for long tenured 
TMTs to persist in strategies, conform to industry trends, and achieve performance near 
industry averages occurred more frequently in industries with high discretion. Haleblian 
and Finkelstein (1993) show environmental dynamism and discretion act as contingency 
forces shaping the relationship between TMT size, CEO dominance, and firm 
performance. Results show large TMTs perform better in turbulent environments and 
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firms with CEOs who are dominant perform worse. This relationship only holds in 
environments allowing top managers discretion in decision making. 
 Recently, work illustrates industry or environmental dynamism moderates a 
range of upper echelon relationships. Simsek and colleagues (2010) find industry 
dynamism moderates the relationship between CEO core self-evaluation and firm 
entrepreneurial orientation. Results show high CEO core self-evaluation is more 
beneficial in highly dynamic environments. Nadkarni and Chen (2014) show industry 
dynamism moderates CEO temporal focus and the rate of new product introduction. 
Specifically, the authors find in stable environments new products are introduced faster 
when CEOs have high past focus, high present focus, and low future focus. 
Contrastingly, in dynamic environments higher rates of new product introduction occur 
with low past focus, high present focus, and high future focus. Nadkarni and colleagues 
(2016) illustrate industry dynamism influences the relationship between executive 
temporal depth and competitive aggressiveness. Findings show past temporal depth is 
associated with higher levels of aggressiveness in less dynamic industries, while future 
temporal depth is associated with aggressiveness in dynamic industries. 
 Across the research on environment a central finding is environmental contexts 
that are less stable encourage change (Kunisch, Bartunek, Mueller, & Huy, 2017). A 
variety of underlying factors have been identified as causing this relationship including 
increases in discretion, higher demands on executives, higher rates of competition, time, 
and institutional factors. As a result, it is widely accepted that environmental 
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characteristics act as salient contingency factors in the upper echelons model (Carpenter 
et al., 2004). 
Leadership Context 
  The leadership context is another important contingency factor shaping upper 
echelons relationships. Work on the leadership context focuses largely on cognitive 
factors shaping the CEO or the CEO-TMT interface.  Simons and colleagues (1999) 
found TMT debate moderates the relationship between TMT diversity and firm 
performance. The authors found having a system for engaging in debate enables TMTs 
to leverage the benefits of heterogeneity allowing for more comprehensive decision 
making and strategies. Ferrier and Lyon (2004) show the heterogeneity of the TMT 
moderated the relationship between strategy and performance. Alexiev and colleagues 
(2010) find TMT heterogeneity moderates TMT advice seeking and exploratory 
innovation with higher levels of heterogeneity positively associated with internal advice 
seeking and exploratory innovation. 
Ou and colleagues (2018) show CEO humility is another important contingency 
factor impacting the relationship between the TMT and CEO. When a CEO is more 
humble it leads to higher levels of collaboration with the TMT causing the firm to adopt 
an ambidextrous strategic orientation leading to higher performance (Ou, Waldman, & 
Peterson, 2018). Carpenter and colleagues (2001) found complementarity among the 
CEO and TMT regarding international experience lead to better performance for 
multinational firms. Complementarity between the TMT and the board has been shown 
to influence technology IPO firms internationalization strategies. Technology firms with 
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TMTs and boards both having international experience were more likely to pursue 
globalization strategies. Kor (2003) illustrates the configuration of executive 
characteristics influences firms pursuing new growth opportunities. Specifically, firms 
with founders participating in the TMT and managers’ with past industry experience 
cause firms to engage in new growth opportunities.  
Research finds social comparison within the leadership context moderates upper 
echelon relationships as well. Ridge and colleagues (2015) find factors increasing or 
inhibiting social comparison and tournament perceptions among TMT members 
influence the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Managerial 
uncertainty preferences is another moderator extant research finds influences managerial 
effects. Heavey and colleagues (2009) show managerial uncertainty preferences 
moderate the relationship between decision comprehensiveness and corporate 
entrepreneurship with acceptance of uncertainty amplifying the positive relationship. 
Temporal leadership is another important factor influencing the relationship between 
CEOs and corporate entrepreneurship. Chen and Nadkarni (2017) find CEOs’ temporal 
leadership (i.e., how they manage TMT time) mediates the CEO temporal disposition 
and corporate entrepreneurship relationship. CEOs who use steady action and early 
action temporal leadership styles positively influence the relationship between temporal 
disposition and corporate entrepreneurship. 
A growing body of research examines CEOs’ values as a contingency factor. 
Extant work finds CEOs’ values help to explain differences among firms engagement in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions (Chin et al., 2013). Research also finds 
 26 
 
differences among CEOs in terms of values acts as a contingency factor shaping the 
CEO-TMT pay decision. Results show liberal CEOs have lower pay gaps with their 
TMTs compared to conservative CEOs (Chin & Semadeni, 2017). Work in finance 
illustrates CEOs values, as measured by political ideology, moderate the corporate 
lobbying firm performance relationship. Unsal and colleagues (2016) find corporate 
lobbying is more effective in firms with liberal CEOs leading to higher firm performance 
because of lower agency costs. Briscoe and colleagues (2014) show CEO values 
moderate the relationship between opportunity structure and social activism. The authors 
show firms with CEOs who have liberal values are perceived as more receptive by social 
activists increasing the likelihood of social activism. 
Changes in values within the leadership context have garnered significant 
scholarly attention as well. Much of this research examines the succession context to 
understand whether the succession process generates a change in values or maintains 
existing values.  Herrmann and Datta (2002) find the characteristics of the CEO’s 
successor impacted the choice of foreign market entry mode. Bigley and Wiersema 
(2002) show heir apparent experience for CEOs has long term impacts on strategic 
decision making leading firms to engage in strategic refocusing and less strategic 
change. Shen and Cannella (2002) illustrate the type of successor matters during CEO 
succession. The authors refine successors intro three types: follower, contender, and 
outsider. Results show contender successors can actually be beneficial for firms because 
it leads to higher levels of TMT turnover. This work extended our knowledge on 
succession by refining the conceptualization of insider successors and drawing attention 
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to the impact the type of successor has on TMT dynamics. Hambrick and Cannella 
(2004) found firm performance suffers when the CEO does not also assume the title of 
COO and, instead, assigns the title to another TMT member. 
Zhang and Qu (2016) highlight how gender change during the succession process 
influences firm performance. Results show gender change during CEO succession 
negatively influences firm performance, but this relationship can be attenuated if 
positive views on female leadership exists in the firm as reflected by the presence of 
females in TMT or on the board. McDonald and colleagues (2018) find the appointment 
of a minority CEO decreases white male top managers’ identification with the 
organization causing them to be less likely to engage in helping behaviors. Dwivedi and 
colleagues (2018) illustrate how characteristics of predecessor CEOs and the succession 
context combine to influence female CEOs’ success. The results show successful female 
CEOs experience a succession process involving gender inclusive gatekeeping whereby 
the former (mostly) male CEOs support the female CEO. 
Strategic Distinctiveness, Optimal Distinctiveness, and Performance 
Scholars have long been interested in why some firms exhibit distinctiveness, 
while most firms are imitative and inertial (Crossland et al., 2014; Kelly & Amburgey, 
1991; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986). The dominant perspective explaining firms 
tendencies towards imitation and inertia rest on the constraining impact existing resource 
configurations and organizational culture have on firms causing firms to develop path 
dependencies as well as conform to normative pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As 
a result, firms that defy inertial and conformity tendencies have garnered researchers’ 
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attention (Boeker, 1997; Crossland et al., 2014; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 
1986). 
Strategic distinctiveness offers a means by which firms can differentiate. 
Strategic distinctiveness (strategic nonconformity) reflects how much a firm’s profile 
differs from the profiles of other firms, or it’s industry’s central tendencies, at any given 
point in time (Crossland et al., 2014). How distinctive a firm is reflects how much a firm 
adheres to (conformity) or ignores (distinct) existing industry norms regarding resource 
allocations (Crossland et al., 2014; Miller & Chen, 1996). Strategic distinctiveness 
involves deliberate choices to not conform and change. Strategic distinctiveness is 
typically measured using firms resource allocation decisions. The way a firm uses it 
resources is important and can directly influence the development of competitive 
advantage and firm performance (Crossland et al., 2014). Scholars capture how a focal 
firm deploys its resources as well as central tendencies for deploying resources in the 
focal firm’s industry. Strategic distinctiveness captures the degree to which a firm’s 
resource deployment decisions deviate from industry central tendencies. Higher levels of 
deviation reflect higher levels of strategic distinctiveness. 
Strategic distinctiveness is important for firms because firms need to differentiate 
enough from peer firms to develop competitive advantages as well as strategic positions 
(Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017). The benefits of competitive advantages and 
strategic positions are well established in the literature (Barney, 1991; Deephouse, 1999; 
Zhao et al., 2017). Strategic distinctiveness has been argued to be a main factor 
influencing competitive advantage and strategic positioning. Competitive advantage 
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derives from having valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 
1991). Sustainable competitive advantages also derive from firms developing unique 
market positions (Deephouse, 1999). Hence, strategic distinctiveness offers a mechanism 
to help distinguish firms which helps firms to develop competitive advantages and 
unique strategic positions. 
At the same time, firms need to be careful about engaging in too much 
distinctiveness. Distinctiveness can lead to generating competitive advantages and 
unique strategic positions lowering competition thereby enabling positive organizational 
outcomes (Deephouse, 1999). However, too much strategic distinctiveness can generate 
negative organizational outcomes because firms lack legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999). 
Firms then need to walk a fine line between too little and too much distinctiveness. This 
notion has generated a large body of research on optimal distinctiveness. 
Optimal distinctiveness refers to achieving the right balance of strategic 
distinctiveness and conformity. Underlying optimal distinctiveness are two theoretical 
mechanisms: differentiation and legitimacy (Zhao et al., 2017). Differentiation as 
alluded to above, is important because it enables a firm to distinguish itself from peers. 
Legitimacy is important because legitimacy shapes perceptions of a firm and firm’s 
ability to acquire resources. Firms that are legitimate adhere to existing expectations, 
norms, and practices enabling them to avoid performance penalties associated with 
deviance (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zhao et al., 2017). 
Optimal distinctiveness has been shown to lead to positive organizational 
performance. Deephouse (1999) was one of the first to illustrate firms using an optimal 
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level of distinctiveness, or what he termed a strategic balance, generate superior 
performance. In his study, he shows commercial banks using an optimal level of 
distinctiveness generated higher return on assets (ROA) than conforming or distinct 
firms. Das and Teng (2000) illustrate how optimal distinctiveness or achieving the right 
balance of distinctiveness and legitimacy enables strategic alliance stability. McNamara 
and colleagues (2003) find firm positioning within a group structure can have firm 
performance implications. The authors find secondary firms, compared to core and 
solitary firms, generate higher ROA because of secondary firms’ ability to effectively 
balance the benefits of strategic distinctiveness with institutional pressures for similarity.  
Research shows the optimal distinctiveness performance relationship matters for 
entrepreneurial ventures as well. Zott and Amit (2007) find optimal distinctiveness in 
entrepreneurial firms positively influences performance. Specifically, the authors find 
entrepreneurial firms using optimal distinctiveness in business model designs generate 
higher stock market value. Wry and colleagues (2014) study how nanotechnology firms 
can secure venture capital funding. The authors show firms striking the correct balance 
between category membership and category spanning obtained the highest amount of 
venture capital funding. 
Overall, research illustrates optimal distinctiveness can generate positive firm 
performance. This suggests an optimal level of distinctiveness might exists for firms 
with a high firm innovation capability reputation. Next I develop my hypotheses on why 
firms with a high firm innovation capability reputation would or would not engage in 
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strategic distinctiveness as well as the implications of strategic distinctiveness for firm 
performance.  
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CHAPTER III 
 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, I develop my hypotheses. Drawing on the literatures above I will 
develop theory on how a firm’s innovation reputation influences the likelihood of firms 
engaging in strategic distinctiveness. Specifically, I will focus on firms with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation. A capability reputation is a type of capability that leads 
firms to be known for generating innovation. This means a firm with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation has an outcome-based reputation because stakeholders 
view the firm’s capability (innovation) as generating specific outcomes (Parker et al., 
2019). 
 I focus on firms with a high firm innovation capability reputation because recent 
conceptualizations suggest an outcome-based reputation such as this generates 
perceptions of discretion in actions for managers (Parker et al., 2019). As outlined 
above, extant work illustrates how important discretion is for strategic distinctiveness. 
This suggests that having a high firm innovation capability reputation may create a 
situation that leads to strategic distinctiveness. First, I examine how having a high firm 
innovation capability reputation will influence the likelihood of firms engaging in 
strategic distinctiveness. Given the lack of clarity in extant organizational reputation 
research I develop opposing theoretical arguments. 
 After developing hypotheses for my main relationships, I move to examine how 
factors in the organizational (prominence), environmental (dynamism), and leadership 
(CEO ideology) contexts could create contingency relationships by generating demands 
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exacerbating aspirations or loss aversion thereby amplifying my main relationships. See 
Figure A1 for my full theoretical model. Below I begin with developing my main 
relationships. 
Main Relationship 
An organization’s reputation is important for organizational outcomes (Ravasi et 
al., 2018). Therefore, it is safe to assume CEOs consider organizational reputation when 
making strategic decisions (Parker et al., 2019). However, virtually no research exists 
examining whether an organization’s reputation actually influences strategic decision 
making. To examine this question, I classify research on organizational reputation into 
two distinct theoretical perspectives: (1) aspirations and (2) loss aversion. Drawing on 
this classification scheme, I develop competing theoretical arguments regarding how an 
organization’s reputation will influence strategic distinctiveness. More specifically, I 
develop arguments around whether organizations with a high firm innovation capability 
reputation, a type of outcome-based reputation, will likely engage in strategic 
distinctiveness. 
 I derive the aspirations perspective from organizational reputation research that 
shares the assumption that organizations and top managers are driven by aspirations to 
meet performance expectations to avoid the potential costs for not meeting expectations. 
Work in this stream proposes aspirations driven by relative performance evaluations act 
as a salient motivating factor driving organizations and top managers’ decisions 
(Mishina et al., 2010). Organizations and top managers form aspirations relative to other 
organizations and top managers. Similarly, stakeholders and others evaluate the 
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performance of the organization relative to peers. Thus, a firm’s performance relative to 
its industry peers, rather than absolute performance, creates pressures on organizations 
and top managers creating high aspirations (Mishina et al., 2010). In strategy, the 
phenomenon has been referred to as the “Red Queen effect” (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, 
& Smith, 2008). The “Red Queen effect” refers to the fact that a firm must perform 
better and better relative to its competition just to maintain its current market position. 
As a result, aspirations will continue to rise, but performance cannot continue to increase 
indefinitely.  The potential loss to the organization and its top managers for not meeting 
aspirations increases the likelihood of the organization engaging in distinctive actions 
(Mishina at al., 2010). 
I derive the loss aversion perspective from organizational reputation research 
utilizing a behavioral theory of the firm perspective. This research shares the assumption 
that organizations and top managers endow the high reputation leading them to begin to 
start counting on it as a firm asset causing them to engage in actions to protect the 
reputation. Work in this stream draws on the notion of loss aversion introduced in 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,1979). Prospect theory explains how individuals’ 
cognitive bias can influence behavioral decision making. Prospect theory argues the 
manner in which individuals frame choices affects how the choices are evaluated and 
choices can be framed as either a gain or loss situation. The theory suggests individuals 
evaluate choices by determining whether it’s a potential gain, sure gain, potential loss, or 
sure loss. The type of situation influences individuals’ behaviors with individuals 
behaving in a risk-averse manner to protect sure gains and a risk-seeking manner to 
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avoid sure losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mishina et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
given relative gains and losses are weighted equally, potential losses loom larger than 
potential gains and will therefore dominate decision making (Kaheman & Tversky, 
1979). This creates a phenomenon known as “loss aversion”. 
The notion of loss aversion has been applied at the firm level as well using a 
behavioral theory of the firm perspective. A dominant stream of loss aversion at the firm 
level examines firms known for being family firms. This research does not explicitly 
label family firms as having a reputation, but it is implied. Family firms value 
socioemotional wealth and have endowed the benefits it provides as a firm asset causing 
them to engage in actions to protect it. Research illustrates family firms utilize a loss 
aversion mentality causing them to avoid actions with high uncertainty (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Greenwood, Diaz, Lie & Lorente, 2010).  Recent 
conceptualizations of organizational reputation suggest the same logic can be applied to 
firms with  a reputation (Parker et al., 2019).This suggests family firms and other firms 
possessing assets like a reputation, could choose to avoid distinctive actions because of 
the high uncertainty involved and potential for loss. 
Below I develop my competing hypotheses drawing on the two distinct 
theoretical perspectives I identify: (1) aspirations and (2) loss aversion. I begin with the 
aspirations perspective and then develop my second main relationship using the loss 
aversion perspective. 
Aspirations  
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Having an organizational reputation places expectations on firms (Lange et al., 
2011; Parker et al., 2019). More specifically, organizations known for something are 
expected to deliver either a desired behavior or outcome to stakeholders. That is, if a 
firm has a behavior-based outcome, stakeholders expect the organization to act in a 
specific way such as acting ethically (Park & Rogan, 2019). Contrastingly, if a firm has 
an outcome-based reputation, stakeholders expect the firm to deliver a specific outcome 
such as high quality products (Parker et al., 2019). To appease stakeholders and maintain 
the firm’s reputation, which is important given the relationship between reputation and 
firm success (Park & Rogan, 2019; Ravasi et al., 2018; Rindova et al., 2005), firms will 
attempt to deliver what stakeholders expect. 
 While reputation places expectations on firms, it also can provide perceived 
discretion to achieve those expectations. Parker and colleagues (2019) describe how the 
reputation a firm has creates areas of perceived discretion that stakeholders pay less 
attention to. A behavior-based reputation reflects stakeholders focusing on the actions 
firms take to achieve outcomes. The focus on actions creates perceived discretion to 
engage in a variety of outcomes as long as the actions remain the same. An outcome-
based reputation means stakeholders expect certain outcomes from firms, but pay less 
attention to how those outcomes are achieved generating perceived discretion in actions. 
A firm with a high firm innovation capability falls into the latter category. 
 Stakeholders of firms with a high firm innovation capability expect those firms to 
deliver the outcome desired (Rindova et al., 2005). Stakeholders pay less attention to 
how firms deliver the innovations even if the strategies firms utilize are highly novel or 
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distinctive. Consider Amazon’s recent acquisition of Whole Foods for $13.7 billion 
dollars or Tesla’s new model 3 car. Both strategies are highly novel with Amazon, an 
online retail giant, purchasing a grocery store and the Model 3 being highly distinct from 
other vehicles in the market (Ladd, 2018; Boudette, 2019). The important point is 
stakeholders do not pay attention to the highly distinct actions because both Amazon and 
Tesla continue to deliver the outcome expected: innovation. 
 The aspirations of Amazon and Tesla motivate the distinctive actions each 
company engages in. Extant organizational reputation research argues aspirations act as 
a powerful force motivating organizations’ and CEOs’ actions (Mishina et al., 2010). 
Specifically, threats of decline in future relative performance and the costs it will bring 
to the organization and executives for not meeting internal aspirations and external 
expectations increases the likelihood of firms engaging in distinctive actions (Mishina et 
al., 2010). This relationship becomes magnified when the organization is known for 
something like innovation. 
 Having a high innovation capability reputation creates internal aspirations within 
an organization. The organization and its executives compare the organization relative to 
its peers in the industry to assess their performance. The organization aspires to maintain 
its high innovation capability reputation and will act to do so. Since the organization’s 
aspirations are relative to its peers, it will look for actions that can help maintain its 
reputation and distinguish it from its peers. The perceived discretion of actions to 
achieve the outcome stakeholders’ desire of firms with a high firm innovation capability 
offers one way for firms to differentiate. Firms may be likely to exploit areas of 
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perceived discretion because aspirations can generate a “Red Queen effect”(Derfus et al., 
2008). That is, firms must continue to perform better and better relative to peers to 
simply maintain its current position. As a result, the reference point for aspirations 
continues to rise, but performance cannot increase indefinitely. Organizations and top 
managers seeking to meet aspirations and avoid the potential costs of not doing so will 
be more willing to use distinctive actions. 
 Extant organizational reputation research supports the notion organizations’ 
aspirations act as a salient motivating factor leading to distinct actions. Mishina and 
colleagues (2010) find organizations with a high reputation engage in corporate illegality 
because of aspirations to maintain the organizations high reputation. Similarly, Haleblian 
and colleagues (2017) find high reputation firms engage in more distinct actions. 
Specifically, the authors find high reputation firms had more unrelated acquisitions 
compared to firms without a high reputation. Both studies only examine firms with a 
high reputation, not a reputation for being known for something. However, it suggests 
aspirations act as a salient force motivating organizations who seek to maintain the 
benefits a reputation provides. As a result, aspirations should motivate firms with a high 
innovation capability reputation to engage in distinct actions. 
 Strategic distinctiveness offers a means by which firms can differentiate. 
Strategic distinctiveness reflects how much a firm’s profile differs from the profiles of 
other firms, or its industry’s central tendencies, at any given point in time (Crossland et 
al., 2014). How distinctive a firm is reflects how much a firm adheres to (conformity) or 
ignores (distinct) existing industry norms regarding resource allocations (Crossland et 
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al., 2014; Miller & Chen, 1996). Strategic distinctiveness offers firms a mechanism to 
help achieve aspirations. Using strategic distinctiveness will aid firms in developing a 
competitive advantage to enable the firm to be able to continue to generate the outcome 
expected as an innovative firm. Further, strategic distinctiveness offers firms a 
mechanism to signal to stakeholders the firm is changing the way it is using resources 
creating a unique strategic position (Deephouse, 1999). This is important because the 
firm recognizes old resource bundles have limited competitive advantage for highly 
innovative firms (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).Thus, a firm with a high innovation capability 
reputation aspiring to maintain its reputation will perceive strategic distinctiveness as an 
attractive option. 
 The above reasoning suggests a firm with a high innovation capability reputation 
aspires to maintain the reputation. To maintain the firm’s reputation top managers need 
to engage in actions allowing the firm to stay ahead of peers as well as distinguish the 
firm from peers. Due to the attention stakeholders give to the outcome the firm is known 
for it creates areas of perceived discretion regarding the actions the firm can engage in. 
The aspiration to maintain the firm’s reputation in combination with top managers’ 
perceptions of discretion and recognition of needing to distinguish the firm suggests the 
firm will likely engage in strategic distinctiveness. Thus, I posit: 
H1a: A high firm innovation capability reputation will be positively associated with 
strategic distinctiveness 
Loss Aversion  
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 At the same time, a firm with a high innovation capability reputation wants to 
avoid losing its reputation. Parker and colleagues (2019) discuss how areas of perceived 
discretion exist, but also imply organizations will likely act to avoid losing the 
organization’s reputation. This is because having a high innovation capability reputation 
offers benefits to firms (Parker et al., 2019; Ravasi et al., 2018; Rindova et al., 2005). 
The benefits that accrue from the reputation shape the firm’s actions. Reputation 
positively impacts a firm’s financial performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), a firm’s 
initial public offering (IPO) (Rindova & Pollock, 2003), how shareholders’ value a firm 
(Zuckerman, 1999), and exchange partners’ loyalty (Park & Rogan, 2019). This 
motivates firms to engage in actions to ensure the expectations stakeholders’ have for the 
firm are met (Parker et al., 2019). 
Possessing a high innovation capability reputation and wanting to avoid losing 
the reputation because of the benefits it offers creates a loss aversion mentality. Loss 
aversion is a decision-making term that has been applied to management research to 
explain strategic decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kuhberger, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999; Miller & Shapira, 2004). Loss aversion differs from risk 
aversion in significant ways. Risk aversion assumes individuals when given the choice 
between two options with equal expected returns will prefer the less risky option 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Risk aversion derives from the expected utility 
maximization of a concave utility of wealth function. That is, individuals who are 
assumed to be rational prefer to avoid situations as they become more risky because the 
utility declines. Loss aversion argues gains contributes less to utility or happiness than 
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an equal loss subtracts from utility or happiness (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Hence, 
loss aversion is about avoiding loss not risk. In fact, loss aversion can involve risk 
aversion and risk taking. For example, an individual could quickly lock in investment 
gains (risk aversion) as well as avoiding selling off a losing stock (risk taking). 
The term loss aversion originates from prospect theory, which is a behavioral 
decision making theory. Prospect theory offers an alternative to pure economic utility 
models. Specifically, prospect theory is grounded in the concepts of endowment and loss 
aversion. Endowment refers to how actors upon receiving an asset endow (include) value 
from the asset in their perceptions which motivates them to focus on protecting the asset 
from downside risk versus trying to increase the upside (Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 
2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In firms with a high firm innovation capability 
reputation, managers endow the high reputation leading them to begin to start counting 
on it as a firm asset causing them to focus on protecting it from downside risk. Thus, 
managers in firms with a high firm innovation reputation who have endowed the high 
reputation seek to maintain the reputation causing them to act in ways to preserve the 
reputation. This leads to a loss aversion mentality.  
Loss aversion from a behavioral theory of the firm perspective has been applied 
to explain firm actions. This research illustrates firms engage in loss aversion actions 
when possessing something beneficial or valuable. Chrisman and Patel (2012) show 
family firms tend to invest less in R&D because of the high uncertainty and to avoid 
losing socioemotional wealth. Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2007) found Spanish 
family firms to be driven by loss aversion as well. Specifically, the authors show 
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Spanish family firms chose to remain independent (risker option) allowing them to avoid 
losing socioemotional wealth rather than join a cooperative (less risker option). This 
work shows firms possessing intangible assets like socioemotional wealth engage in 
actions to avoid losing those assets. 
Extending this logic to organizational reputation suggests firms with a high 
innovation capability reputation might be less likely to engage in strategic 
distinctiveness and more likely to conform. If a firm with a high innovation capability 
reputation endows the benefits the reputation offers it creates benefits the firm values. 
This creates a situation where the firm seeks to avoid losing the benefits. As a result, 
even though perceived areas of discretion exist exploiting them involves uncertainty and 
risk. Hence, firms with a high innovation capability reputation would be less likely to 
exploit areas of perceived discretion because of the desire to avoid losing the reputation 
they possess. Even if conformity, adhering to previous actions and industry central 
tendencies, may be objectively risky it is perceived as a way to avoid losing the firm’s 
reputation. 
 Thus, extant research on organizational reputation suggests competing logics 
exist (Parker et al., 2019). One the one hand, research suggests the areas of perceived 
discretion and aspirations to maintain the high innovation capability reputation will 
cause firms to engage in strategic distinctiveness. Contrastingly, research also suggests 
the desire to maintain the high innovation capability reputation could cause firms to 
engage in loss aversion decision making decreasing the likelihood of engaging in 
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strategic distinctiveness. Given the lack of clarity, I propose a competing hypothesis. 
Thus, I post: 
 H1b: A high firm innovation capability reputation will be negatively associated 
with strategic distinctiveness  
Organizational Context: Prominence 
An organization’s context acts as a salient factor shaping managerial decision 
making. Contingencies in the organizational context can alter relationships by either 
amplifying or attenuating effects. An organization’s strategies and structure act as two of 
the central contingency factors (Carpenter et al., 2004). Organizational prominence 
captures the size of the organization in the public’s mind. Extant research illustrates 
factors capturing the size of the organization, like prominence, can create contingency 
relationships (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015). Below I 
develop hypotheses on how organizational prominence can amplify my main 
relationships. 
An organization’s reputation contains several dimensions. One dimension is what 
the organization is known for (Lange et al., 2011). A firm with a high firm innovation 
capability reputation is known for producing innovative outcomes. Another important 
dimension of reputation is whether the firm is known (Lange et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 
2005). Being known reflects the generalized awareness of the firm or prominence of the 
firm in the collective perception (Lange et al., 2011).  Firm prominence is beneficial for 
firm success (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999). 
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 At the same time, prominence brings higher demands (Rindova et al., 2005; 
Mishina et al., 2010; Haleblian, Pfarrer, & Kiley, 2017). Prominence develops because 
the firm becomes widely recognized. Rindova and colleagues (2005) identify third-party 
intermediaries such as the media as important antecedents to generating prominence. For 
example, Apple is known all across the world. The reason individuals have a general 
awareness of Apple is because it delivers innovative outcomes like the iphone (Porter, 
2018). The outcomes Apple deliver result in media attention raising general awareness 
about Apple. The prominence for its iphone and the brand led Apple to become the first 
company valued at $1 trillion dollars (Porter, 2018).  This suggests firms with 
prominence were focused on by the media, and, in order to maintain the firm’s 
prominence, the firm will need to maintain media interest. For firms with a high 
innovation reputation, prominence derives from the media focusing on the firms’ ability 
to deliver a specific outcome: innovation. The attention from the media develops a 
general recognition of the firm. Media attention also creates higher demands on the firm 
to be the most prominent firm delivering the outcome expected. 
 The demands resulting from prominence can exacerbate the aspirations the 
organization already had for itself. Previously, the organization’s aspirations were to 
simply be better relative to peers at delivering the outcome expected from stakeholders. 
Adding in prominence increases the aspirations thereby increasing the demands on the 
organization. The relative performance comparisons for the organization and its 
executives will increase causing the standard of performance to be raised. In other 
words, prominence can magnify the ‘Red Queen effect” because the reference point for 
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aspirations is being raised even higher (Derfus et al., 2008). As a result, firms will be 
looking for ways to continue to deliver the outcome expected and maintain the attention 
of important actors like the media who can shape prominence.  
 Higher demands will impact the organization’s actions. Extant organizational 
reputation research shows prominence acts as a salient force shaping organizational 
actions. Research finds prominence motivates organizations to engage in distinct actions 
like corporate illegality (Mishina et al., 2010) or unrelated acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 
2017). Distinct actions result because organizations and top managers strive to maintain 
the performance expectations established for the organization. Failing to achieve the 
performance standards would cost the organization and its executives. To avoid the 
potential costs the organization and its executives consider a wider range of possibilities 
to help maintain performance. This means the areas of discretion the organization and its 
top executives consider will be magnified. Thus, the demands from prominence can 
cause top managers to consider distinct actions.   
 Prominence then will positively influence the pressure towards strategic 
distinctiveness in firms with a high firm innovation capability reputation. Prominence 
requires the firm to stay relevant by maintaining relevance to third party intermediaries. 
One way to maintain the attention of third party actors like the media is by constantly 
altering the firm or engaging in change. Another important part of prominence is 
standing out relative to peer firms. Most firms are changing on a frequent basis given 
frequent change is correlated with better performance (Klarner & Raisch, 2013). Firms 
will have to do something different that helps to distinguish the firm. Differentiating 
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from other peer firms is important because it will impact where in stakeholders’ minds 
firms reside. That is, highly prominent firms are thought to be of higher status than less 
prominent firms (Rindova et al., 2005). 
 As a result, prominence will amplify the positive relationship between having a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Specifically, 
prominence exacerbates the aspirations of the organization leading top managers to 
engage in decision making that leads to distinct actions. Firms will utilize strategic 
distinctiveness to ensure the firm continues to stand out relative to other firms allowing 
it to achieve its aspirations. By doing so, the firm can maintain the favorable outcomes 
likely to result from being perceived as highly innovative and prominent (Ravasi et al., 
2018). Thus, I posit: 
H2a: Organizational prominence will amplify the positive relationship between a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness  
Prominence can also create additional benefits for the firm. Extant organizational 
reputation research highlights prominence generates favorable organizational outcomes 
(Ravasi et al., 2018). Roberts and Dowling (2002) find highly prominent firms achieve 
higher financial performance relative to non-prominent firms. Pollock and Rindova 
(2003) show firm prominence positively influences IPO pricing. Pfarrer and colleagues 
(2010) find highly prominent firms receive higher market rewards for earnings surprises 
and lower penalties for negative earnings surprises.  
 Possessing organizational prominence offers another benefit to firms. For firms 
possessing prominence, once the organization endows the benefits it will seek to avoid 
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losing those benefits. The additional benefit prominence offers to firms creates added 
demands on the organization. Specifically, now the organization must engage in actions 
to avoid losing prominence in addition to maintaining its reputation for being known for 
innovation. 
 Once the organization endows the benefits from prominence it will amplify loss 
aversion. Amplifying loss aversion means the organization will be more careful in 
choosing the actions it considers. This leads to lower perceptions of discretion in the 
organization. Previously, the organization was only trying to protect a single reputation. 
Now the organization possesses two reputations, innovation and prominence, and seeks 
to avoid losing either of the benefits each reputation offers. The amplification of loss 
aversion will manifest in strategic decision making. 
 Organizations can choose to either conform or be distinct. Conformity reflects 
adhering to previous actions the organization or other peer organizations normally 
engage in. Conformity offers organizations benefits because it is familiar, minimizes 
search and analysis costs, and signals legitimacy (Hambrick et al., 2005; Deephouse, 
1999). Contrastingly, distinct actions enable a firm to stand out relative to peer firms. 
Yet, distinct actions involve high uncertainty because the firm is differentiating from 
normal tendencies which can create cognitive dissonance if distinctiveness becomes too 
high (Deephouse, 1999; Zhao et al., 2017). For an organization with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation distinct actions will be less attractive. This is because 
distinct actions involve high uncertainty which increases the chances of potential loss. 
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The amplification of loss aversion because of prominence will make distinct actions 
even less attractive.   
 As a result, prominence will amplify the negative relationship between having a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Organizations 
with a high firm innovation capability reputation already utilize a loss aversion mentality 
in decision making. Prominence exacerbates the loss aversion mentality because the 
organization now has additional benefits it has endowed and wants to avoid losing. This 
will cause organizations to avoid distinct strategies that could result in loss in favor of 
familiar strategies. Strategic distinctiveness will be perceived less favorably because of 
the potential losses that could result. Thus, I posit:  
H2b: Organizational prominence will amplify the negative relationship between a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness  
Environmental Context: Environmental Dynamism 
The environmental context is another important factor shaping strategic decision 
making. Factors in the environmental context can create contingencies altering decision 
making processes by impacting stability and change. Contingencies in the environment 
shape decision making processes (Carpenter et al., 2004). A central factor in the 
environmental context is environmental dynamism.  
 Environmental dynamism consists of two underlying components: volatility and 
unpredictability (Miller & Friesen, 1983). Volatility refers to the amount and rate of 
change within an environment. Unpredictability refers to the level of uncertainty in the 
environment. Volatility and uncertainty are fundamental characteristics of environmental 
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dynamism (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Schilke, 2014). Several factors feed into 
environmental dynamism including factors such as stock market instability, changes in 
industry structure, innovation, technological discontinuity, competitive rivalry, and 
environmental shocks (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Schilke, 2014). Highly dynamic 
environments are characterized by rapid and discontinuous change, while less dynamic 
environments are characterized by infrequent changes that can usually be predicted by 
market participants. 
 For organizations with a high firm innovation capability reputation, 
environmental dynamism can impact aspirations. Organizations and top managers form 
aspirations using relative performance evaluations of peer organizations (Mishina et al., 
2010). These aspirations motivate organizations and top managers’ actions because not 
meeting aspirations generates costs to the organization and its top managers. This can 
lead to a “Red Queen effect” whereby aspirations continually rise, but performance 
increases cannot occur indefinitely leading organizations and top managers to be open to 
distinct actions. Environmental dynamism will exacerbate aspirations. 
 In highly dynamic environments change is frequent and unpredictable. This will 
impact the relative performance evaluations underlying the aspirations firms with a high 
firm innovation capability reputation hold. Environmental dynamism will increase the 
rate of change and unpredictability in relative performance aspirations. The rate of 
change will increase because environmental dynamism can shift the peer organizations 
firms utilize to make relative performance evaluations. Unpredictability in relative 
performance evaluations can occur because environmental dynamism can shift normal 
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means of evaluating performance such as if an innovation changed the rules of the game 
in an industry. This means the aspirations of firms with a high firm innovation capability 
reputation will be increasingly under potential threat. 
 To avoid not meeting aspirations and the potential costs to the organization and 
its top managers, the organization will likely be motivated to consider distinctive 
actions. The attractiveness of distinctive actions will be amplified by environmental 
dynamism. Environmental dynamism involves frequent unpredictable change limiting 
competitive advantages and the sustainability of unique strategic positions. As a result, 
the organization and its top managers will have to continually find new ways to be able 
to meet aspirations. 
 Extant research shows distinctive actions can be beneficial in highly dynamic 
environments. Jansen and colleagues (2006) show pursuing exploratory innovation is 
effective in highly dynamic environments leading to better firm performance. Further, 
Zahra and Bogner (2006) find distinctive actions benefit software new ventures in 
dynamic environments. Specifically, the authors find new product radicality led to high 
performance when environmental dynamism was high. Karna and colleagues (2016) 
further support the notion distinctive actions can be beneficial in highly dynamic 
environments. The authors conduct a meta-analysis of the dynamic capabilities—
performance relationship and find dynamic capabilities are more strongly linked with 
performance in highly dynamic environments compared to stable environments. 
 Thus, environmental dynamism will exacerbate aspirations for firms with a high 
firm innovation capability reputation. High rates of change and unpredictability will 
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cause performance standards to change putting increasing pressure on firms and top 
managers to continually meet aspirations. To try and meet aspirations and avoid the 
potential costs of not doing so, the organization and its top managers will likely consider 
distinctive actions. Distinctive actions have been shown to be beneficial in highly 
dynamic environments helping firms to develop competitive advantages and unique 
strategic positions. Hence, environmental dynamism because it exacerbates aspirations 
will amplify the positive relationship between a high firm innovation capability 
reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Thus, I posit: 
H3a: Environmental dynamism will amplify the positive relationship between a high 
firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness  
Organizations with a high firm innovation capability reputation can utilize a loss 
aversion perspective. A loss aversion perspective occurs because the organization and its 
top managers endow the reputation as a firm asset and begin to count on it as an asset 
causing the organization and its top managers to protect it. Specifically, organizations 
that have endowed the reputation and the benefits the reputation provides as a firm asset 
will be motivated to avoid losing the asset. The potential consequences of losing 
reputation will loom larger than any potential gains thereby creating a loss aversion 
mentality. 
 Loss aversion causes the organization and its top managers to avoid uncertain 
actions that could result in possible losses. Environmental dynamism will impact loss 
aversion. Highly dynamic environments are characterized by frequent unpredictable 
change (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Schilke, 2014). The 
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unpredictability and volatility of dynamic environments occurs for a variety of reasons 
including stock market instability, changes in industry structure, innovation, 
technological discontinuity, competitive rivalry, and environmental shocks (Geletkanycz 
& Hambrick, 1997; Schilke, 2014). Environmental dynamism will exacerbate loss 
aversion by increasing the uncertainty around the organization. As a result, the 
organization and its top managers will be more motivated to avoid losing the 
organization’s reputation. 
 Exacerbating loss aversion will make strategic distinctiveness less attractive in 
highly dynamic environments. The organization and its top managers will be looking for 
ways to protect the organization’s reputation to avoid losing the reputation as a firm 
asset. In highly dynamic environments research shows conformity can be beneficial for 
firms. Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) show strategic conformity is highly beneficial 
for firms in environments characterized by high uncertainty. The logic behind 
conformity being beneficial in highly dynamic environments hinges on legitimacy 
(Deephouse, 1999). By conforming, organizations are utilizing strategies and practices 
stakeholders recognize as legitimate resulting in the organization being perceived as 
legitimate. Legitimacy is important because it influences access to resources and social 
approval of organizations. Thus, by conforming the organization is utilizing strategies 
and practices with lower uncertainty thereby helping the organization to avoid a loss. 
 For organizations with a high firm innovation capability reputation, the 
reputation creates benefits the organization and its top managers endow as a firm asset. 
This creates a loss aversion mentality because losing the organization’s reputation 
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outweighs any potential gain. The high uncertainty and frequent change environmental 
dynamism brings will exacerbate loss aversion. As a result, the organization and its top 
managers will be more likely to look for actions that help the organization avoid loss. 
Strategic distinctiveness involves high uncertainty and environmental dynamism 
increases the uncertainty around the organization. Hence, environmental dynamism will 
exacerbate loss aversion amplifying the negative relationship between a high firm 
innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Thus, I posit:  
H3b: Environmental dynamism will amplify the negative relationship between a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness  
Leadership Context: CEO ideology 
The leadership context is another important factor that can create contingency 
relationships for an organization aspiring to maintain its high firm innovation capability 
reputation. Upper echelons research draws attention to the differences among CEOs as 
important contingency factors. Heavey and colleagues (2009) show uncertainty 
preferences among CEOs moderate the relationship between decision 
comprehensiveness and corporate entrepreneurship. Ou and colleagues (2018) find CEO 
hubris is an important moderator influencing collaboration among the CEO and TMT 
impacting firm performance. Chen and Nadkarni (2017) show CEOs temporal leadership 
acts as an important contingency factor shaping the relationship between CEO temporal 
disposition and corporate entrepreneurship. Gupta and colleagues (2018) find CEO 
personality traits, narcissism and extraversion, moderate the relationship between CEO 
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ideology and firm strategies. Collectively, research finds executive characteristics act as 
a central contingency factor within the leadership context. 
 A central characteristic individuals differ on that shapes the demands executives 
experience is political ideology.  Political ideologies reflect a system of values that 
collectively reflect individual’s preferences for “how society should be governed” (Jost, 
Federico, and Napier, 2009: 309). Political ideologies are a reflection of individuals’ 
deeply held values and preferences which meaningfully influence the decisions they 
make (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Additionally, scholars have shown that 
individuals’ ideologies tend to be rather stable by adulthood and that the conservative-
liberal spectrum is the most often used and predictive way to categorize individuals’ in 
terms of their ideology and its influence (Jost 2006). Conservatives tend to favor 
individualism, stability, small government and free markets and, land rights, whereas 
liberals tend to favor social welfare, new experiences, environmentalism and, 
egalitarianism (Jost et al., 2009). Thus, political ideologies are held to influence the 
manner in which individuals’ act. 
 Differences in the political ideologies of CEOs of firms with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation should matter. As outlined above, firms with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation are driven by aspirations to maintain the reputation 
leading them to engage in strategic distinctiveness. Yet, this relationship may either be 
amplified or attenuated depending on the CEO’s political ideology. Examining the 
differences among conservative and liberal CEOs suggest political ideology captures the 
different demands ideology places on individuals. The demands political ideology places 
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on individuals differ along two dimensions: preference for social change and equality. 
Studies show conservatives tend to adhere to the status quo when considering what 
actions to take. Christensen and colleagues (2015) show how conservative top 
management teams (TMT) lead firms to follow status quo ways of filing taxes compared 
to liberal TMTs that are more active in avoiding taxes. Furthermore, work in political 
psychology shows that conservatives tend to want to reduce uncertainties, while liberals 
are more comfortable with uncertainties and will change more often and take more risks 
(Jost et al., 2008). 
 Conservatives accept inequality and resist social change. Several scholars have 
shown how liberal political ideologies lead to higher rates of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) strategies among firms (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, & 
Hambrick, 2017). Similarly, Briscoe and colleagues (2014) show firms with liberal 
CEOs are more likely to be the target of shareholder activism because of liberals’ 
openness to change and social equality. This led firms with liberal CEOs to be more 
likely to develop LGBT employees groups. This work shows firms with executives who 
have liberal ideologies engage in more novel strategies compared to firms with 
conservative executives. 
 Extant work on political ideology suggests conservatives are driven by 
performance aspirations more than liberals. Research shows conservatives care more 
about individualism and free markets (Jost et al., 2009). Further, extant research shows 
liberals tend to engage in distinct actions more than liberals such as CSR (Chin et al., 
2013; Gupta et al., 2017). However, the distinct strategies liberals engage in like CSR 
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have no clear relationship with performance. In fact, a majority of the research 
illustrating liberals engagement in distinctive strategies focuses on social strategies that 
have no clear impact on firm performance (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Chin et 
al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017).  
 For firms with a high innovation capability reputation aspiring to maintain the 
reputation the CEOs’ political ideology will matter. Conservative CEOs accept 
inequality and reject social change. This causes conservative CEOs to engage in actions 
that help them to maintain power. Two central drivers of conservative ideologies are 
individualism and stability (Jost et al., 2009). Conservative CEOs want to maintain the 
system they exist in because it offers benefits. For firms with a high firm innovation 
capability reputation having a conservative CEO will amplify aspirations. A 
conservative CEO will seek to make sure his firm remains powerful and maintains the 
benefits accruing from its reputation. The focus on maintaining the organization’s 
reputation and achieving performance expectations increases the possible actions open to 
the firm. The main focus for the CEO is to avoid the potential costs to himself/herself 
and the organization for failing to meet performance aspirations. This can increase the 
likelihood of the organization engaging in distinct strategies (Mishina et al., 2010; 
Haleblian et al., 2017). 
 Overall, the political ideology of the CEO is an important contingency factor in 
the leadership context. Given conservative CEOs acceptance of inequality and rejection 
of social change it will exacerbate aspirations. As a result, the relationship between a 
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high firm capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness will be amplified. Thus, I 
posit: 
H4a: CEO conservative ideology will amplify the positive relationship between a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness  
Loss aversion is another motivating factor for organizations with a high firm 
innovation capability reputation. For organizations that have endowed the benefits of 
having a high firm innovation capability reputation a loss situation exists. The 
organization possess a benefit it seeks to maintain causing it to engage in actions that 
help to avoid loss at all costs. Avoiding losing its reputation becomes more important 
than any relative gain. 
 The characteristics of the CEO will impact the loss aversion framing. As alluded 
to above, conservative and liberal CEOs face different demands. Conservative CEOs 
accept inequality and reject social change. A central underlying theme differentiating the 
two ideologies is preference for the status quo (Jost et al., 2009). Conservatives tend to 
prefer the status quo because it offers certainty, while liberals accept higher levels of 
uncertainty and are open to a wider range of possibilities. 
 Extant research on executives’ political ideologies illustrates conservatives 
engage in actions supporting the status quo (Chin et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 2015; 
Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2017). Although not explicit in this research, it implies 
conservatives utilize a loss aversion type mentality. Specifically, conservatives engage in 
actions to support the status quo because they do not want to lose the certainty it 
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provides. This suggests having a conservative CEO generates a loss aversion mentality 
in the leadership context. 
 The loss aversion mentality of a conservative CEO limits the range of actions the 
organization can consider. Loss aversion values avoiding a loss more than any relative 
gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The organization has the possibility to choose 
actions conforming to normal tendencies or engage in distinct actions. Distinct actions 
involve high uncertainty because the organization is distinguishing itself from other peer 
organizations. A loss aversion mentality will view highly uncertain actions as 
unattractive relative to conforming actions. Conformity offers legitimacy benefits 
decreasing the likelihood of the organization experiencing a loss (Deephouse, 1999). 
 For organizations with a high firm innovation capability reputation, having a 
conservative CEO will amplify its desire to avoid losing its reputation. Conservatives 
prefer the status quo and choose actions that are familiar and certain. The status quo for 
an organization with a high firm innovation capability reputation is being known for 
innovation. A conservative CEO will seek to maintain this recognition and the certain 
benefits it provides the organization.  As a result, a loss aversion mentality will permeate 
the leadership of the organization. This will cause the organization as a whole to focus 
on avoiding losing its reputation decreasing the likelihood of engaging in strategic 
distinctiveness. Thus, I posit: 
H4b: CEO conservative ideology will amplify the negative relationship between a 
high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness 
Performance  
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Firms with an outcome-based reputation are expected to deliver specific 
outcomes. For a firm with a high firm innovation capability reputation stakeholders 
expect innovation. Meeting stakeholders’ expectations is important because it impacts 
firm performance (Graffin et al., 2016; Parker et al., 2019). Part of meeting stakeholders’ 
expectations is engaging in actions that are perceived as helping to generate innovation. 
Firms with a high firm innovation capability reputation must also stand out 
relative to peer firms (Rindova et al., 2005). That is, stakeholders need to recognize the 
firm in order for its reputation to be maintained. Firms need to be careful in how the firm 
attempts to differentiate itself. While differentiation helps the firm to stand out relative 
to peers, the organization does not want to be too different (Brewer, 1991; Deephouse, 
1999; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017). An optimal level of distinctiveness 
exists for firms. 
 The relationship between distinctiveness and firm performance reflects an 
additive benefit/cost relationship (Haans, Pieters, & He, 2016). Underlying 
distinctiveness are two distinct causal mechanisms: legitimacy and differentiation 
(Deephouse, 1999; Zhao et al 2017). Differentiation refers to how much a firm is distinct 
from peer firms in its industry. The benefits of differentiation display a positive linear 
relationship. That is, as differentiation increases firms gain quicker access to resources 
and become more prominent in stakeholders’ minds (Deephouse, 1999). At the same 
time, the more distinct a firm becomes the quicker the costs associated with legitimacy 
increase. The more distinct a firm is the less it looks like other firms and what 
stakeholders’ perceive as legitimate making it increasingly difficult to recognize the firm 
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(Deephouse, 1999). Subtracting the costs of legitimacy from the benefits of 
differentiation suggests an inverted U-relationship between distinctiveness and 
performance exists. Firms want to try to attain the right amount of differentiation before 
the turning point where it becomes negative because the legitimacy costs outweigh the 
benefits. 
 An optimal level exists between too little and too much distinctiveness. Firms 
that can engage in the right level of distinctiveness will be most effective. This is 
because the recognition signal the firm is sending via strategic distinctiveness is 
perceived positively by stakeholders. The firm will conform enough to peer firms, while 
simultaneously differentiating in an effective manner. These firms will garner the 
legitimacy and resource benefits accruing to optimally distinct firms (Deephouse, 1999; 
Zhao et al., 2017). Thus, I posit: 
H5: For a firm with a high firm innovation capability reputation engaging in 
strategic distinctiveness will have an inverse-U relationship with performance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 METHODS  
Sample 
My sample consists of publicly traded S&P 1500 firms from 2007-2015. I choose 
the time frame 2007-2015 to avoid potentially confounding my analysis because of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002-2003). Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) was a major shift in corporate 
governance impacting firms and executives’ strategic decisions (Krause & Semadeni, 
2014). Specifically, SOX was an external force potentially influencing the likelihood of 
engaging in strategic distinctiveness. As a result, I chose the time frame 2007-2015 
because it captured a time period after the SOX regulations where firms and executives 
had already adapted thereby minimizing the potential of confounding my analyses. 
  I collected data for my sample from a variety of sources including the 
Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS), Compustat, Execucomp, Ravenpack News 
Analytic database, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Research Quotient, 
and Thomson Reuter database. All of these databases are available through the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). To gather 
information on executives’ political ideology I utilized the Federal Election Commission 
data on political donations. This database is a publicly-available database that tracks 
political donations over $200. 
 Board level data was collected from the ISS database. The Thompson Reuter and 
Execucomp databases provided data on ownership structure and compensation, 
respectively. The Ravepack News Analytic database provided data on firm actions. Firm 
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and industry level characteristics were gathered from Compustat. A firm’s innovation 
reputation was developed from information in the Research Quotient database. Finally, I 
utilize the CSRP database to merge data from the different databases.  
Dependent Variables: Strategic Conformity/Distinctiveness and Performance 
Following Crossland and colleagues (2014), I operationalize strategic 
distinctiveness. I only utilize strategic distinctiveness because my theory and hypotheses 
focus on distinctiveness. That being said, change is built into the strategic distinctiveness 
measure so I do capture change as well.  
Strategic Conformity/Distinctiveness. 
To operationalize strategic distinctiveness I use six resource allocation variables. 
For each year, I take each variable and calculate the standardized absolute difference 
between the firm’s score and the industry mean (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; 
Crossland et al., 2014). I then take the log of each and sum the six individual variables to 
create an overall strategic conformity/distinctiveness index for the firm in that year 
(Crossland et al., 2014). 
 Following extant approaches I calculate resource reallocation as the year-on-year 
absolute change in six strategic choice variables (1) advertising intensity (advertising 
expenditures/ sales), (2) R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/sales), (3) overhead 
efficiency (selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales), (4) capital intensity 
(fixed assets/total employees), (5) plant and equipment newness (net plant and 
equipment/ gross plant and equipment), and (6) financial leverage (total debt/ 
shareholder’s equity) (Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011; Crossland et al., 2014). To 
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eliminate the influence of extreme variables I Winsorize at the 2% level (Crossland et 
al., 2014). Using the six variables, I calculate absolute differences in year-to-year and 
create a single standardized index of resource reallocation. Higher levels reflect greater 
resource reallocation. 
 I label this variable strategic conformity. Positive values reflect conformity, 
while negative values reflect distinctiveness. To perform my regression analyses I utilize 
the forward command in Stata 15 to create a lead strategic conformity measure. 
Performance  
 To test my performance relationship I use return on equity (ROE) as my 
dependent variable. I follow extant research using an accounting based measure because 
I am interested in assessing the performance implications of business strategies 
(Chadwick, Super, & Kwon, 2015: Cook & Glass, 2014; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997). ROE captures how a firm manages its capital 
providing a picture of whether management is growing the company’s value.  To 
calculate ROE I divide net income by total shareholders’ equity. I winsorize and 
standardize the measure to eliminate outliers that might conflate my analysis. To insure 
outliers did not provide unique theoretical insights I ran the analysis with the 
standardized and non-standardized measures. The results did not change significantly in 
terms of size or significance. For robustness purposes, I also ran the analyses with total 
return to shareholders as the outcome variable and the results did not change 
significantly in terms of size or significance I label this variable ROE. 
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Independent Variable: Innovation Outcome-Based Reputation 
I calculate an innovation outcome-based reputation for all firms on the S&P 
1500.  I utilize the Research Quotient database to obtain a measure of each firm’s 
research quotient (RQ). This measure reflects a firm’s capability of generating returns 
from investments in research and development (R&D). Higher levels of RQ mean the 
organization has a capability to develop innovation from its investments in R&D. I 
utilize this measure of innovation rather than patents because greater than 50% of firms 
that engage in R&D do not obtain patents (Cooper, Knott, & Yang, 2015). Hence, the 
RQ measure captures a wider range of innovation relative to patents. Further, the RQ 
measure aligns with extant conceptualizations of an outcome-based reputation because 
the organization is known for having a capability to generate innovation (Parker et al., 
2018). 
 Specifically, RQ reflects the percentage increase in revenues from a 1% increase 
in R&D, when other inputs and their elasticities are held constant. Firms can generate a 
high RQ by generating a large number of innovations and being reasonable effective 
exploiting them, or by effectively exploiting a smaller number of innovations (RQ 
Manual). The equation is: 
 
where Y is output, Ait is a firm fixed effect, Kit is capital, Lit is labor, Rit is lagged R&D, 
Sit is lagged spillovers, and Dit is advertising. RQ is estimated using entirely financial 
data and can be derived for any firm engaging in R&D. To get the RQ values for each 
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firm a random coefficients model is used that allows for heterogeneity in the output 
elasticity R&D (as well as other inputs)(RQ Manual). 
 Random coefficient models are those in which each coefficient has two 
components 1) the direct effect of the explanatory variable and 2) the random component 
that proxies for the effects of omitted variables. The random coefficient model estimated 
for equation 1 above is below, where 𝛽_ and 𝛽_𝑖: represent the direct effect and the firm 
specific error, respectively for each component in equation 1: 
 
 
  
To construct RQ for each firm-year, the equation utilizes rolling 10 year windows of 
Compustat data from 1965-2015. Firm level data includes (in $MM unless otherwise 
stated): revenues (𝑌𝑖𝑡), capital as net property, plant and equipment (𝐾𝑖𝑡 ), labor as full 
time equivalent employees (1000)( 𝐿𝑖𝑡 ), advertising (𝐷𝑖𝑡 ), and R&D (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ). From the 
primary data, a secondary measure of firm specific spillovers (𝑆𝑖, ) is computed as the 
sum of differences in knowledge between the focal firm and rival firm for all firms in the 
four digit SIC industry with more knowledge (R&D) than the focal firm. 
 All firms need to have a minimum of six years of data in each ten year window to 
be included in the estimation. Each RQ estimate compares revenues to inputs using up to 
ten firm-year observations matching revenues to inputs. This measure has been used in 
extant work on R&D and absorptive capacity (Knott, 2008). I label this variable RQ. 
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Moderator Variables: Organizational, Environmental, and Leadership 
In this section I describe how I measure each of my three context variables. I 
begin with the organizational context (prominence) then move to the environmental 
context (dynamism) and conclude with the leadership context (CEO ideology). 
Organizational Prominence  
 I follow extant approaches for operationalizing organizational prominence 
(Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Pollock and Rindova (2003) examine how many times the 
media mentions an organization or volume of media coverage. This is done by counting 
the total number of articles about an organization. The outlets I examine come from the 
Dow Jones Newswire, which tracks news on S&P 1500 companies. I use the RavenPack 
News Analytic database to access articles about the organizations in my sample. 
 To ensure each article focuses on the focal organization I limited my analysis to 
articles where the relevance score equaled 100. The relevance score in RavenPack 
reflects whether the news article is about the focal organization. An article with a 
relevance score of 100 means the article is about the organization. A lower relevance 
score reflects the focal firm is not the focus of the article. After limiting based on the 
relevance score, I then created a count variable for each firm for each year to capture 
total media coverage. 
Environmental Dynamism 
 Environmental dynamism reflects volatility, instability, and turbulence in an 
industry (Dess & Beard, 1984).To create my measure of environmental dynamism I 
follow extant approaches (Dess & Beard, 1984; Wowak, Mannor, Arrfelt, & McNamara, 
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2016). Specifically, I follow extant approaches and create Dess and Beard’s (1984) 
widely used industry based environmental dynamism measure (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 
2005; Girod & Whittington, 2017). Dynamism is the volatility of the rate of change of 
annual industry sales, that is, the standard error of the rate of change of annual industry 
sales (McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008). It is calculated as the standard error of the 
regression of sales over time divided by mean industry sales (Boyd et al., 2005; 
McNamara et al., 2008). I create my environmental dynamism measure at the 2 digit SIC 
code level. 
CEO ideology  
 Since I am interested in the role of CEO ideology I follow previous studies in 
calculating CEO ideology. I use political donation data from the Federal Election 
Commission. I calculate the net donations made to the Republican Party (total amount 
donated to the Republican Party minus donated to the Democratic Party, divided by total 
amounts donated to both parties and averaged by election cycles) (Christensen, 
Dhaliwal, Boive, & Graffin, 2015).  I label this variable as CEO conservatism, which 
ranges from –1 to +1, –1 being most liberal, +1 being most conservative. 
Control Variables 
I control for a number of variables including executive, organizational, and 
industry factors. Executive factors include CEO age (in years, at the start of each year), 
CEO tenure (years at current firm at the start of each year), CEO incentive compensation 
(total compensation minus cash compensation (salary and bonus)), CEO ownership 
(number of shares owned by CEO divided by total outstanding shares multiplied by 
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100), CEO outsider (if CEO entered role from outside the firm), Duality (CEO is 
simultaneously the Board Chair), CEO director (number of directors appointed by 
CEO), and CEO outside board seats (count of the number of board appointments). 
Organizational factors include size (log of total employees), performance (return on 
equity and earnings per share), atlman’s z score (proximity to bankruptcy), working 
capital (current liabilities minus current assets). I also control for several board factors 
including independence (number of independent directors divided by board size), board 
size (total number of directors), females on board (count of number of females on board 
divided), recalls (count of the number of product recalls) and board ideology. 
 To calculate board ideology I utilize the political donation data I used to 
calculate CEO political ideology following extant studies (Christensen et al., 2015; 
Gupta & Wowak, 2017). Using the individual ideology scores of directors I created a 
board ideology measure. Specifically, I created a board liberalism measure by adding the 
ideology scores of each director. I did not put weight on any particular director’s 
ideology since each director has equal voting power over any governance decision. I 
excluded CEO’s political ideology in this calculation if the CEO was also a director of 
the board.  
 I also control for two important types of institutional investors: dedicated and 
transient. To calculate dedicated and transient institutional ownership I follow extant 
work and use Bushee’s (1998) classification system. To be classified as an institutional 
owner, the shareholder must hold at least one percent equity in the firm during my 
sample time frame. An institutional owner is either classified as dedicated, transient, or 
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quasi. I focus on the former two, but quasi institutional investors refer to investors who 
abdicate their monitoring role deferring to broad indexes regardless of the actions firms 
take (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010). Abdicating their monitoring role means 
they are of little interest from a governance perspective (Bushee, 1998).  Dedicated and 
transient ownership reflects the amount of shares held by dedicated and transient 
institutional investors.  
 To generate dedicated versus transient, I follow extant approaches utilizing 
Bushee’s data (http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html) which 
categorizes each institutional investor according to their past trading behavior. I label 
these variables as Dedicated institutional ownership and Transient institutional 
ownership. For a complete detail of the underlying process Bushee uses see Connelly 
and colleagues (2017) work. 
 Finally, I control for differences in the availability of resources at the industry 
level. I create an industry munificence variable. I create the munificence variable at the 2 
digit SIC code level. To create the variables I follow extant guidelines and utilize the 
Dess and Beard (1984) approach (Wowak, Mannor, Arrfelt, & McNamara, 2016). 
Analysis 
To conduct my analysis I engaged in several steps. First, I gathered my variables 
and ran both fixed effects and random effects panel regressions in Stata 15 using the 
xtreg command. After running and saving the results from the fixed and random effects 
model I performed the Huasman test. A significant effect from the Huasman test 
indicates the random effects model is inappropriate and a fixed effects model should be 
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used. Performing the Huasman test showed the fixed effects model was the most 
appropriate approach. Thus, I ran my analysis using the xtreg command in Stata 15 with 
the robust and fixed effects options specified. 
Endogeneity Analysis 
After running my fixed effects panel model, I examined the possibility of an 
omitted variable impacting my results. To do so, I utilized the Konfound command in 
Stata 15. The Konfound command allows you to understand how much influence an 
omitted variable would have to explain to impact your results and what correlation 
would be needed for an omitted variable to impact your results. Higher levels are better 
and signal an omitted variable is unlikely to be biasing the results. To perform the 
Konfound command I utilize the estimated coefficient for my indicator variable, 
standard error, sample size, and number of predictor variables in the model. I ran the 
Kondfound command (.08 .05 2987 27) in Stata 15. The results indicated endogeneity or 
an omitted variable may be a problem. Specifically, the results showed 18.40% of the 
estimate would have to be due to bias and an omitted variable would have to be 
correlated with the predictor and outcome at 0.08. That is, an omitted variable would 
have to be correlated with RQ and strategic distinctiveness at 0.08 to invalidate any 
inferences. In my data the mean correlation with RQ is 0.05 and the mean correlation 
with strategic distinctiveness is 0.05. However, a few variables were correlated with RQ 
and/or strategic distinctiveness at a level greater than 0.08. Hence, I needed to address 
the potential of endogeneity in my analysis. 
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Two Stage Least Squares 
Given endogeneity was a potential issue, I turned to the two stage least squares 
model. In this approach, you need to identify potential instruments to use in the analysis. 
A good instrumental variable will be highly correlated with your predictor variable and 
not highly correlated with the error term. You also need to address the potential 
endogeneity of instruments because using endogenous instruments can conflate analyses 
as well (Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014). I identified three potential instrumental 
variables: industry median RQ (excluding focal firm), industry median working capital, 
and new product releases. Theoretically each of these factors has been shown to be 
related to innovation and distinctiveness. Extant work on discretion illustrates an 
organization’s working capital influences distinctiveness and innovation (Wangrow, 
Schepker, & Barker, 2015). Similarly, the nature of a firm’s industry has been shown to 
be a salient factor shaping innovation and distinctiveness (Deephouse, 1999). Finally, 
new product releases reflect a type of innovation. Each of these variables you would 
expect to be highly correlated with a firm’s RQ or innovation reputation. 
 Once I identified my possible instruments, I performed analysis to see which 
combination of instruments was most appropriate and whether my instruments were 
exogenous. Table B1 presents the results of my analysis. To assess the appropriateness 
and exogeneity of my instruments, I used the ivreg command in Stata 15 and examined 
the F statistics and Hansen J’s statistic. Stock and Yogo (2002) provide benchmarks to 
assess the weakness of instruments. Using two instruments the F-statistic should be 
equal to or greater than 11.59.  The results indicated the instruments industry median RQ 
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(excluding focal firm) and new product releases were strong instruments (F=31.55 and 
p=.000). Further, the Hansen J’s statistic indicated the instruments were exogenous 
(Hansen J=.6406). Hence, I use industry median RQ and new product releases as 
instrumental variables in my analyses.  
Performing Regression Analysis 
I used the instrumental variables to perform my analysis. Since my data is panel 
data I used the xtivreg command in Stata 15 to perform my analysis. I specified I wanted 
to instrument my main predictor variable RQ using industry median RQ and industry 
median working capital. 
Performing SEM Analysis  
To analyze my performance hypothesis I utilize SEM. To perform the analysis I 
use the sem command in Stata 15. Utilizing this command creates two separate 
regression equations essentially. The first equation analyzes predictors influencing 
strategic conformity. The second equation examines the full path from predictors of 
strategic conformity to the influence of conformity on performance. The pathreg 
command in Stata 15 is another means to specify the equation and provides identical 
results.  
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CHAPTER V 
 RESULTS 
Table B2 reports the descriptive statistics. The mean of strategic conformity is 
2.72 suggesting most firms tend not to conform on a scale of 0 to 10 with 10 reflecting 
high conformity. RQ and strategic conformity are positively correlated at 0.02. CEOs in 
my sample tend to be conservative with a mean of 0.18 on a scale of 1 to -1 with 1 being 
conservative. Environmental dynamism on average is fairly low across the firms in my 
sample with a mean of 0.03. The average firm in my sample is mentioned in slightly 
more than 200 news articles per year. In addition, while I do find some high correlations 
in my data, after running ordinary least squares (OLS) models and calculating variance 
inflation factors (VIFs), I found no VIF exceed 6.00 well under the recommended cutoff 
of 10 suggesting that multicollinearity is likely not an issue. 
Table B3 reports the results from the regression analysis. Model 1 is the main 
relationship with controls and Model 2 is the full model with interactions. I report the 
findings from my analysis below. Hypothesis 1a argued having a high firm innovation 
capability reputation would be positively associated with strategic distinctiveness. 
Hypothesis 1b argued having a high firm innovation capability reputation would be 
negatively associated with strategic distinctiveness. I do not find statistical support for 
hypothesis 1a or 1b ((b=.52 p=.56).  
I proposed factors in the organizational, environmental, and leadership contexts 
could create contingency relationships amplifying my main competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a argued organizational prominence would amplify the positive relationship 
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between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness due to 
higher demands which would magnify aspirations. Hypothesis 2b argued organizational 
prominence would amplify the negative relationship between a high firm innovation 
capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness because it would exacerbate loss 
aversion. The results fail to achieve statistical significance (b=.0003 p=.136). Hence, I 
do not find support for Hypothesis 2a or Hypothesis 2b. 
 In Hypothesis 3a, I argued environmental dynamism would exacerbate 
aspirations amplifying the positive relationship between a high firm innovation 
capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. In Hypothesis 3b, I argued 
environmental dynamism would exacerbate loss aversion amplifying the negative 
relationship between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic 
distinctiveness. The results fail to achieve statistical significance (b= .05 p= .197). Thus, 
I do not find support for Hypothesis 3a or 3b. 
 For Hypothesis 4a, I argued conservative CEOs exacerbate aspirations 
amplifying the positive relationship between a high firm innovation capability reputation 
and strategic distinctiveness. In Hypothesis 4b, I argued conservative CEOs exacerbate 
loss aversion due to their preference for stability and the status quo amplifying the 
negative relationship between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic 
distinctiveness.  I find support for hypothesis 4b (b=.08 p=.048). Interpreting the 
interaction, firms with a conservative CEO tend to, on average, have lower levels of 
distinctiveness than firms with liberal CEOs. This suggests that CEO conservatism 
conditions the relationship between RQ and strategic distinctiveness such that firms with 
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a conservative CEO tend to utilize a loss aversion perspective causing them to be less 
likely to use distinctive actions.  
 To test Hypothesis 5, I conducted SEM analysis. Table B4 reports the results. I 
hypothesized for firms with a high innovation reputation engaging in strategic 
distinctiveness displays an inverse U-relationship with performance. Model 1 reports the 
first stage with strategic conformity the outcome. Model 2 reports the second stage with 
return on equity (ROE) the outcome. The overall model display good fit (RMSEA=0.00, 
CFI=1.00, SRMR=0.00). I find support for hypothesis 6 (b= -3.60 p=.009). This result 
shows the squared term of strategic conformity is negatively related to performance. 
Hence, the result suggests an optimal level of strategic distinctiveness exists for firms 
with a high innovation capability reputation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation I sought to examine the influence a firm’s reputation has on 
strategic decision making. Extant work on organizational reputation suggests the type of 
reputation a firm possesses could create areas of perceived discretion for managers 
(Parker et al., 2019). Further, extant work on organizational reputation suggests firms 
face pressures to maintain their reputation (Rindova et al., 2005). Building from this 
work, I develop theory on why a firm with a specific outcome based reputation for 
innovation would likely engage in strategic distinctiveness. I integrate the upper 
echelons literature with the organizational reputation literature to develop contingency 
relationships that would either amplify or attenuate the likelihood of firms engaging in 
strategic distinctiveness. 
 In hypothesis 1a, I argued firms with a high innovation reputation would be 
likely to engage in strategic distinctiveness. I built from extant work on organizational 
reputation arguing managers of firms known for something perceive areas of discretion 
exist. Specifically, firms known for an outcome, like innovation, perceive discretion in 
the behaviors or actions the firm can take (Parker et al., 2019). Since organizational 
reputation offers benefits firms will likely have aspirations to maintain the firm’s 
reputation (Rindova et al., 2005; Mishina et al., 2010).  Having a high firm innovation 
capability reputation means the firm needs to continue to generate innovation to 
maintain its high reputation. Innovation requires change and novelty suggesting firms 
would be likely to engage in strategic distinctiveness. For these reasons, I hypothesized a 
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positive relationship existed between a high firm innovation capability reputation and 
strategic distinctiveness. 
 Contrastingly, in hypothesis 1b, I develop a competing hypothesis suggesting a 
negative relationship existed between a high firm innovation capability reputation and 
strategic distinctiveness. I draw on organizational reputation literature which suggests 
firms want to maintain a high reputation and value the benefits it offers. Firms endow 
the value attached to the reputation and perceive it as a firm asset that needs to be 
protected. This creates a loss aversion approach causing firms to engage in actions to 
maintain the benefits and avoid loss (Devers et al., 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Exploiting areas of perceived discretion attached to a high innovation reputation 
involves high uncertainty and, as a result, decreases the likelihood of strategic 
distinctiveness. 
 My results did not provide statistical support for either of my competing 
hypotheses. The direction of the relationship supports the logic behind hypothesis 1b. I 
think this could be for a couple reasons. First, my measure of a high innovation 
capability reputation really only captures exploitation of investing in R&D. That is, a 
firm’s RQ reflects efficiency at generating revenue from investments in R&D. The 
measure is an innovation measure, but only captures exploitation innovation rather than 
exploration innovation. This might explain why firms with a high RQ are less likely to 
engage in strategic distinctiveness. If a firm is highly efficient at engaging in innovation, 
it would be unlikely to drastically change its approach. This is magnified by the fact that 
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when things are going well for organizations there is often resistance to novelty and a 
preference for the status quo (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991). 
 To examine the potential for firms with a high innovation capability reputation 
preferring conformity, I did some additional exploratory analysis. If a firm with a high 
innovation capability reputation prefers the status quo it should also be less likely to 
introduce new products. New products offer another measure of innovation and involve 
risk on the part of the organization. In my exploratory analysis I found having a high 
firm innovation capability reputation was negatively associated with new product 
introductions. This suggests firms with a high innovation capability reputation see the 
firm as possessing something good and want to continue to exploit it rather than engage 
in exploratory innovation. 
 Another reasons for my results may be my proxy for a high innovation capability 
reputation is not perfect. As mentioned above, the measure really only captures 
exploitation of money invested in R&D and does not capture exploratory innovation. It 
may be that some firms do engage in a high level of exploratory innovation, but the 
measure does not allow me to capture this. It seems like the perfect measure of an 
innovation reputation needs to possess both performance and perceptual dimensions. My 
measure really only deals with the performance dimension regarding generating 
revenues from R&D. A perceptual measure of novelty is also needed. However, this 
does raise an interesting point regarding the difference between perception and 
performance. Do the two dimensions act uniformly on firms influencing strategic 
decision making or might they act differently? Do firms need to possess both 
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performance and perception to be considered novel and which one impacts performance 
more? The point is, I think measuring a high firm innovation reputation is complex. In 
this study, I took a step towards beginning to develop a measure of a high firm 
innovation capability reputation. Moving forward I would like to further develop this 
measure and explore what an innovation reputation entails and how best to capture it. In 
doing so, I hope to better understand how a high firm innovation reputation will 
influence strategic decision making. 
 After establishing my baseline hypothesis, I developed arguments on how 
organizational, environmental, and leadership contexts can create contingency 
relationships exacerbating aspirations or loss aversion that would either amplify or 
attenuate my main competing hypotheses. I began with the organizational context. In 
hypothesis 2a, I argued prominence exacerbates aspirations. The relative performance 
standards the organization and its executives use increase. The increase in the standards 
means the benefits as well as the costs of not meeting performance expectations 
increase. As a result, the organization and its top managers will be more motivated to 
avoid the potential costs which amplifies the positive relationship between a high firm 
innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Contrastingly, in 
hypothesis 2b, I argued prominence generates additional benefits for the organization 
which can exacerbate loss aversion. Exacerbating loss aversion amplifies the negative 
relationship between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic 
distinctiveness. I found prominence amplifies the negative relationship, but the results 
failed to achieve statistical significance. 
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 The results suggest support for the loss aversion perspective. Both prominence 
and having a high innovation capability reputation offer benefits to firms. As a result, 
firms may simply want to continue with the status quo and focus on conforming to avoid 
losing the benefits. Changing things up could cause the firm to lose what it is known for 
or prominence. My measure of prominence could potentially suffer from weaknesses as 
well. Today, social media is the main force by which stakeholders and general audiences 
impact organizations. It no longer takes a large social movement or the media to shape 
public perception or awareness of an organization. This means general awareness of the 
organization can shift rapidly to focus on unethical behaviors with only one tweet. 
People will be more likely to tweet about prominent organizations especially if the 
organization does something wrong. It seems prominence could be argued both ways 
possibly suggesting further examination of the role of prominence on strategic decision 
making could be warranted. 
 Moving to the environmental context, I examined environmental dynamism. In 
hypothesis 3a, I argued environmental dynamism would exacerbate aspirations. As a 
result, the organization and its top managers would be more open to distinct actions to 
help meet aspirations. This would amplify the positive relationship between a high firm 
innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. In hypothesis 3b, I argued 
environmental dynamism would increase uncertainty around the organization 
exacerbating loss aversion. As a result, environmental dynamism would amplify the 
negative relationship between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic 
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distinctiveness. I found environmental dynamism amplifies the negative relationship, but 
the results failed to achieve statistical significance. 
 Examining the results, suggests further support for the loss aversion perspective. 
Even though my results fail to achieve statistical significance, it suggest further research 
is warranted. One reason I may not have found a statistically significant result is industry 
dynamism is not a direct measure of firm uncertainty. Rather, industry dynamism 
captures instability, volatility, and uncertainty at the industry level. To truly capture 
when firms utilize a loss aversion perspective it might be valuable to examine the focus 
of uncertainty. For example, measures of uncertainty at the firm, industry, and macro 
level could provide insight into when a firm is most likely to engage in less strategic 
distinctiveness to protect valuable firm assets. A weakness of my study is that I do not 
capture firm or macro level uncertainty. Moving forward, I plan on examining how 
different types of uncertainty might provide insight in my main relationships. 
 Next, I examined the leadership context focusing on CEO ideology. In 
hypothesis 4a, I argued a conservative CEO would exacerbate the aspirations a firm with 
a high innovation capability reputation has. Conservatives are driven by individualism 
and market forces suggesting performance aspirations are important to them explaining 
why they accept inequality. This led me to hypothesize conservative CEOs because they 
exacerbate aspirations would amplify the positive relationship between a high firm 
innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. For the competing 
hypothesis 4b, I argue conservative CEOs exacerbate loss aversion. Extant work 
illustrates conservatives prefer stability and the status quo (Jost et al., 2009). As a result, 
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conservative CEOs exacerbate loss aversion amplifying the negative relationship 
between a high firm innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. 
 My results supported hypothesis 4b.  This is not surprising given the things I 
have discussed above regarding my measure of innovation reputation and desire to 
maintain the reputation tends to lead to preferring the status quo. Having a conservative 
CEO would only strengthen the desire to conform and exploit the organizations ability to 
generate revenue from R&D.  
 For my final hypothesis, I examined the influence of strategic distinctiveness on 
firm performance. I argued there would be an inverse U-relationship between strategic 
distinctiveness and firm performance. In other words, an optimal level of distinctiveness 
exists and would lead to the best performance. Basically, firms that are not distinct will 
generate no benefits and firms that are too distinct will incur penalties because it 
becomes difficult to recognize the firm and the innovation it generates. Hence, using an 
optimal level of distinctiveness to differentiate from peer firms, but not too much would 
lead to the best performance. 
 My results supported my hypothesis that an optimal level of distinctiveness leads 
to positive firm performance. This suggests distinctiveness acts as a central factor 
audiences perceive when evaluating firms. This complements extant work on 
organizational reputation by showing distinctiveness is an important mediating factor 
impacting the beneficial aspects of reputation. Extant work on organizational reputation 
has examined specific CEO decisions (Mishina et al., 2010), but this work is too narrow 
in its consideration of the decisions high reputation might impact. In this dissertation, I 
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examine a wide range of actions and whether those actions are distinct from normal 
tendencies in the industry. In doing so, I illustrate it is the distinctiveness of actions that 
impacts whether firms will experience the beneficial aspects of reputation. My results 
suggest an optimal level of distinctiveness exists for firms with a high innovation 
reputation. Achieving the optimal level of distinctiveness enables firms to generate high 
performance. 
Overall, the results from my dissertation support a loss aversion perspective. 
Although I fail to find statistical support, my results suggest the loss aversion 
perspective holds more weight than the aspirations perspective. Furthermore, loss 
aversion can become exacerbated by contingencies in the organizational, environmental, 
and leadership contexts. I found organizational prominence, environmental dynamism, 
and conservative CEOs all amplify the negative relationship between high firm 
innovation capability reputation and strategic distinctiveness. Only conservative CEOs 
was statistically significant, with prominence and environmental dynamism barely 
missing marginal significance. While loss aversion and seeking to protect the benefits 
reputation offers are not totally bad, exacerbating loss aversion could cause a firm with a 
high innovation capability reputation to stop generating innovation. 
 The results raise interesting questions regarding the risks associated with 
pursuing a high firm innovation capability reputation. From my dissertation the results 
show organizations that possess a high firm innovation capability reputation utilize a 
loss aversion perspective. This becomes exacerbated by contextual factors exacerbating 
loss aversion. It raises the question of how an innovative organization pursuing a high 
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reputation can utilize factors to avoid loss aversion becoming the dominant logic of the 
firm. What are the implications of loss aversion becoming the dominant logic? Might 
this explain differences between organizations perceived as innovative and organizations 
that perform innovatively? I believe a range of interesting future research questions can 
be asked and I detail some of these after I highlight my contributions and limitations. 
Contributions 
Several contributions result from my dissertation. First, I contribute to the 
organizational reputation literature by studying how an organization’s reputation 
influences strategic decision making. Extant work on organizational reputation does not 
consider what influence an organization’s reputation might have on strategic decision 
making. Building from recent refinements of the being known for something dimension 
of organizational reputation (Parker et al., 2019), I examine how having a high firm 
innovation capability reputation influences strategic novelty. Parker and colleagues 
(2019) suggest the type of reputation an organization possesses influences the areas of 
discretion top managers perceive. A large body of work exists showing the discretion top 
managers have influences strategic decision making (Wangrow et al., 2015). Integrating 
these two lines of reasoning suggests the type of reputation an organization holds 
because it influences top managers’ perceptions of discretion should impact strategic 
decision making. To my knowledge, I am the first to conceptualize how an 
organization’s reputation influences strategic decision making. In doing so, I draw 
attention to the important role organizational reputation plays in strategic decision 
making. 
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 Second, I further contribute to the organizational reputation literature as well as 
the strategic leadership literature by empirically testing how an organization’s outcome-
based reputation influences strategic decisions at the executive level. To date, only a 
single study exists examining the influence of an organization’s outcome based 
reputation and this work focuses on stakeholders’ decisions (Park & Rogan, 2019). I 
complement and extend recent work by testing how an organization’s outcome-based 
reputation influences strategic distinctiveness a central strategic decision CEOs make. 
While my results did not provide significant support, they do suggest an organization’s 
outcome-based reputation manifests in strategic decision making. Given the nascent 
stage of research in this area I believe this is encouraging and should spur further 
research examining the link between organizational reputation and strategic decision 
making. 
 Third, I contribute to the organizational reputation literature by illustrating the 
distinctiveness of a firm’s actions is an important mediating factor influencing the 
beneficial aspects of reputation. Extant work has examined single actions and the impact 
those actions have on firms with a high reputation (Mishina et al., 2010). However, this 
work is too narrow in its consideration of the decisions high reputation might impact. 
Rather, work needs to examine the level of distinctiveness across a range of actions to 
better help us understand when and why high reputation generates favorable 
organizational outcomes. Showing the distinctiveness of a firm’s actions is an important 
factor influencing the beneficial aspects of organizational reputation contributes to work 
on the boundary conditions of organizational reputation (Zavyalova et al., 2016). 
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 Finally, I introduce a measure of a firm’s innovation capability future research 
can utilize. This contributes to the organizational reputation literature because it provides 
an objective measure scholars can use in their studies. The lone study examining an 
organization’s outcome-based reputation uses a survey to capture firm’s reputations. 
While surveys can be beneficial they suffer from several weaknesses as well. 
Introducing the RQ measure offers an objective alternative easily available to scholars. 
Furthermore, it provides benefits over patent based measures which fail to capture over 
50% of firms engaging in R&D because not all firms obtain patents (Cooper et al., 
2015). 
Limitations 
My dissertation is not without limitations. A central limitation of my study is the 
use of only U.S. based firms. My data comes from the S&P 1500 which is a U.S. based 
index. Although the S&P 1500 does contain foreign firms (e.g. Samsung) it does have a 
western bias. Companies not listed on the S&P 1500 or non-western indexes exist in 
different contexts that could view innovation differently. For example, many collectivist 
cultures utilize a social perspective where the group or collective is the focus. This could 
cause non-western companies to be more likely to engage in social innovations. Social 
innovations may or may not involve R&D and the results of social innovation may 
generate intangible rather than tangible returns. In my study, I only capture the tangible 
returns to firms for investments in R&D. As a result, I could be failing to capture other 
types of innovation that many firms may engage in that do not generate economic 
returns. 
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 Another limitation of my study is I do not capture a firm’s behavior-based 
reputation. I intended on using the governance ratings index from the Institutional 
Shareholders Service (ISS). This index originally only captured governance scores, but 
has expanded to capture social and environmental scores (ESG). However, the ESG 
ratings have only been in existence since 2018. Previously, ISS did provide a governance 
score, but this began in 2013-2014. As an additional source I considered using corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) data from the KLD database. However, my dependent 
variable is strategic distinctiveness and utilizing resources in a socially responsible way 
could reflect strategic distinctiveness. Hence, I could not utilize CSR because it might 
conflate with my DV of strategic distinctiveness. Moving forward I hope the ISS ESG 
ratings become widely available and utilized. If this occurs, if offers an excellent 
objective proxy to capture behavior-based reputations. Even though I do not directly 
utilize a variable capturing a firm’s behavior-based outcome, I do control for several 
governance factors expected of ethical organizations. For example, I control for board 
independence as well as the power of the CEO by coding duality. While not direct 
governance scores these factors often underlie governance scores offered by third parties 
like ISS. This also aligns with Park and Rogan (2019) who use ethical behavior to 
capture a firm’s behavior-based reputation. 
 Finally, my measure of a firm’s innovation capability has its limitations. For one, 
the measure only captures a firm’s efficiency at generating innovation. The measure 
does not capture how innovative stakeholders perceive the firm to be. This is important 
because perception and performance are two distinct components of innovation. People 
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need to perceive what the firm is doing is in fact innovative. My measure does not 
contain a perceptual component limiting what type of innovative firms I actually capture. 
For example, most startups and new ventures will not generate returns from R&D for 
several years. Yet, people perceive startups and new ventures to be highly innovative. 
Extant work on discretion illustrates pressures for conformity influence strategic actions 
(Wangrow et al., 2015). Firms perceived as highly innovative likely feel pressures to 
engage in specific actions stakeholders’ expect from innovative firms. I am unable to 
capture the influence perceptions of innovation might have on strategic decision making 
with my measure. 
Future Research 
Moving forward I see several fruitful avenues for future research on 
organizational reputation and strategic decision making. First, I think future research on 
organizational reputation can further explore the distinction between performance and 
perception. Do organizations actually have to have both components of a reputation? 
Extant organizational reputation research suggests reputation reflects collective social 
judgements about an organization regarding specific qualities or capabilities (Boivie et 
al., 2016). Yet, little research on organizational reputation examines whether the 
collective social judgement reflects performance or perception. For example, a company 
could have a reputation for innovation because the products they offer involve radical 
technological changes. At the same time, a company could have a reputation for 
innovation because the company is perceived as being highly innovative when in fact its 
product is not that innovative.  
 89 
 
The differences between the basis for each company’s reputation could impact its 
discretion and strategic decision making. Consider a trucking company that develops 
highly innovative wheels for cargo trucks. The products the company makes are highly 
innovative (performance) yet the company is not perceived as highly innovative 
(perceptual). This creates an environment with higher discretion and less pressure. Could 
this explain why some companies today still have all male boards? Or why some 
executives’ tenures exceed the normal 3 to 5 years of most CEOs? Theoretically 
developing what an innovation reputation actually entails is important for future research 
trying to study firms with an innovation reputation. 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to link the work on 
organizational reputation with the categories literature. Having a reputation places an 
organization into a specific category. Categories reflect theories of value with each 
category representing a different value. In each category actors seek specific things they 
value and when they match an entities features to the things they value they categorize 
the company. Innovative companies reflect certain features actors’ value and when they 
see a company displaying those features they categorize the company as innovative. 
Despite the overlap between the two literature streams little integration has occurred. I 
believe the recent work on organizational reputation and discretion I build upon can help 
understand categorical constraint and manipulation. 
The actions a firm with a reputation engages in not only impact the focal firm, 
but likely impact other firms in the category as well. This is particularly true of 
innovative firms. This suggests the type of reputation an organization possess influences 
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the constraint on the category. Further, the actions firms engage in can alter the nature of 
categorical constraint. For example, innovative firms today are thought to be highly tech 
savy. How might firms strategically manipulate the constraints for being tech savvy to 
their benefit and what impact would it have on the category overall? 
 Finally, I think opportunity exists to integrate the organizational reputation 
literature with work on values to understand how firms strategically use values to 
develop specific reputations. Recent work on values argues values are social tools not 
simply ideals individuals possess in their minds (Rindova & Martins, 2017). Reputations 
reflect a collective social judgement about a focal firm delivering some specific value. 
Recently, work on organizational reputation shows audience members to be more active 
than previously conceptualized with the advent of social media (Etter et al., 2019). I 
believe firms can be active participants in shaping reputations as well. I think 
strategically utilizing values offers firms one means to do so. A firm could use values to 
highlight the firm’s attractiveness to specific actors who act as gatekeepers to specific 
categories. Or a firm might use values to attack arguments from detractors who do not 
see a firm in a specific light. For example, a firm being accused of not being innovative 
might attack the detractors arguments by utilizing universal values to highlight the long 
term nature of the firm’s innovation rendering the detractor’s arguments mute because it 
solely focused on the short term. I think future theoretical work examining the strategic 
use of values in shaping reputation offers a fruitful path. 
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Conclusion  
In this dissertation I set out to understand how organizational reputation 
influences strategic decision making. I drew on extant organizational reputation and 
upper echelons literature to develop my arguments. My conceptualization offers a 
contribution to the organizational reputation and strategic leadership literatures. 
Specifically, to my knowledge I am the first to link how the discretion attached to a 
specific type of reputation could influence the strategic decisions CEOs make. This 
complements recent work on organizational reputation that shows the type of reputation 
a firm possesses, behavior versus character, can influence external stakeholders strategic 
decision making (Park & Rogan, 2019).   
  To test my arguments I utilize a unique measure of innovation reputation. 
Although the results did not support my main hypothesis, I do believe my measure of 
innovation reputation offers a baseline to begin to capture the influence of an innovation 
reputation on strategic decision making. One of my moderating arguments did show 
significant relationships suggesting my measure is tapping into something influencing 
strategic decision making. Moving forward, I plan on further exploring how having a 
high firm innovation capability reputation might influence additional strategic decisions 
beyond strategic distinctiveness. 
 Overall, the results in my dissertation do not provide clear support suggesting a 
firm’s reputation manifests in strategic decision making. Despite this, I believe 
examining the relationship between an organization’s reputation and strategic decision 
making is pragmatically and theoretically important. Looking at organizations such as 
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Patagonia or Apple suggests the reputations these firms possess do influence the actions 
each engages in. Hence, I hope this dissertation spurs a line of research for myself and 
others examining the role of organizational reputation in strategic decision making. 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure A1. Theoretical Model  
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1. IV regression Instruments 
 RQ 
Industry median RQ .33*** 
New Product Release .07+ 
F statistic (2, 2427) 31.55*** 
Hansen J 0.64 
N 2462 
*Stock & Yogo recommend F statistic for 2 instruments >=11.59 
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Table B2. Means and Correlationsa 
 Variables  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13   
1. Strategic Conformity 2.72 0.06 1             
2. RQ 0.13 1.87 0.02 1            
3. CEO conservatism 0.18 0.64     -0.04 -0.05 1           
4. Dedicated Institutional investors 1.75 3.96 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 1          
5. Transient Institutional investors 15.76 8.70 0.00 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 1         
6. Board Liberalism 0.23 0.71 -0.08 -0.01 0.21 0.01 -0.02 1        
7. Altz 5.22 4.71 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 1       
8. Average board tenure 10.28 3.26 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.15 1      
9. Board Independence 0.80 0.10 -0.05 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.19 -0.39 1     
10. CEO outside board seats 8.50 5.50 -0.01 0.03 0.11 0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.29 -0.27 0.36 1    
11. Duality 0.48 0.50 -0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.17 0.11 1   
12. Females on board 1.17 1.05 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.21 -0.22 0.31 0.47 0.13 1  
13. Board size 9.00 2.13 -0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 -0.15 0.13 -0.27 -0.16 0.28 0.66 0.09 0.60 1 
14. Working capital 0.42 0.72 0.17 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.16 0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.16 -0.19 
15. Industry Dynamism 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 
16. Industry Munificence 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 
17. Year 2011 2.55 0.01 -0.18 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.15 0.03 
18. CEO age 56.00 6.95 0.00 -0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.06 0.01 0.26 -0.02 0.00 0.26 -0.02 0.02 
19. CEO tenure 11.40 8.40 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.16 0.55 -0.23 -0.24 0.36 -0.21 -0.21 
20. CEO incentive compensation 0.76 0.19 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.11 -0.25 0.29 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.29 
21. CEO ownership 1.83 5.43 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.28 -0.25 -0.28 0.19 -0.23 -0.27 
22. CEO director 4.01 2.83 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.41 0.14 0.26 
23. Inside CEO 0.98 0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.07 
24. ROE 0.14 1.50 -0.11 0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.13 
25. Earnings per share 1.90 2.80 -0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.16 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.27 
26. Firm size 2.00 1.25 -0.11 -0.05 0.14 -0.01 -0.13 0.08 -0.30 -0.13 0.26 0.63 0.18 0.51 0.66 
27. Recall 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.20 0.21 
28. Prominence 203.2 168 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.17 0.17 0.50 0.11 0.40 0.46 
 
 Variables 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
14. Working capital 1               
15. Industry Dynamism -0.04 1              
16. Industry Munificence -0.03 0.27 1             
17. Year -0.03 0.19 -0.07 1            
18. CEO age 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 1           
19. CEO tenure 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.46 1          
20. CEO incentive compensation -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.13 -0.26 1         
21. CEO ownership 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.52 -0.29 1        
22. CEO director -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.29 0.63 0.01 0.19 1       
23. Inside CEO -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.18 1      
24. ROE -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.03 1     
25. Earnings per share -0.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.06 0.17 -0.12 0.06 0.04 0.48 1    
26. Firm size -0.25 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.14 0.31 -0.22 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.41 1   
27. Recall -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.22 1  
28. Prominence -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 0.24 -0.13 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.26 0.67 0.27 1 
aN=3,338.  
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Table B3. XTivreg models of firm innovation capability reputation on strategic conformity. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
RQ 0.522 0.0299 
 (0.895) (0.0766) 
Board liberalism -0.0588 -0.0702 
 (0.0729) (0.0579) 
Altz 0.0951 0.0518 
 (0.0826) (0.0524) 
AvgBrdTenure 0.0537 0.0749 
 (0.0969) (0.0683) 
BrdIndepen 0.0765 0.0749 
 (0.0568) (0.0559) 
CEOoutbrd -0.0294 -0.0184 
 (0.0789) (0.0775) 
Duality 0.0986 0.0816 
 (0.113) (0.103) 
Femalebrd 0.0258 0.00405 
 (0.0812) (0.0681) 
Brdsize 0.0912 0.108 
 (0.0916) (0.0767) 
Working capital 0.234* 0.188** 
 (0.0978) (0.0644) 
Industry munificence 0.0566 0.0625 
 (0.0398) (0.0382) 
CEO age -0.166* -0.138* 
 (0.0770) (0.0588) 
CEO tenure 0.206 0.175+ 
 (0.127) (0.0994) 
CEO incentive compensation -0.0604 -0.0399 
 (0.0598) (0.0416) 
CEO ownership -0.0601 -0.0582 
 (0.0729) (0.0704) 
CEO dir -0.0357 -0.0362 
 (0.0253) (0.0248) 
Inside Ceo 0.310 0.308 
 (0.234) (0.225) 
roe -0.0461 -0.0426 
 (0.0365) (0.0341) 
earnings_per_share 0.0251 0.0273 
 (0.0528) (0.0519) 
Firm size 0.229 0.0573 
 (0.468) (0.265) 
Recall -0.0729 -0.0952 
 (0.177) (0.175) 
Dedicated institutional ownership -0.0815+ -0.0825+ 
 (0.0460) (0.0447) 
Transient institutional ownership 0.00109 -0.0141 
 (0.0481) (0.0358) 
CEO conservatism 0.0373 0.0133 
 (0.0875) (0.0638) 
CEO conservatism X RQ  0.0834* 
  (0.0422) 
Industry dynamism -0.0706 -0.0567 
 (0.0487) (0.0377) 
Industry dynamism X RQ  0.047 
  (0.0367) 
Prominence -0.0841 -0.000524 
 (0.0714) (0.000397) 
Prominence X RQ  0.000384 
  (0.000257) 
Year Included Included 
Constant 2.803*** 3.030*** 
Observations 2,462 2,462 
Number of gvkey 495 495 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table B4. SEM Analysis of strategic conformity on performance. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Strategic conformity  25.19** 
  (9.716) 
RQ -0.347 0.322 
 (0.390) (0.342) 
CEO conservatism 0.614 -0.212 
 (0.401) (0.328) 
Dedicated institutional ownership -0.0543 1.448* 
 (0.362) (0.635) 
Transient institutional ownership 0.192 0.609 
 (0.381) (0.391) 
Board liberalism -0.876* -0.438 
 (0.416) (0.350) 
Altz 2.397*** -1.531* 
 (0.680) (0.714) 
AvgBrdTenure 0.335 -0.0951 
 (0.548) (0.452) 
BrdIndepen 0.0461 -0.346 
 (0.436) (0.387) 
CEOoutbrd -1.114+ -0.923 
 (0.624) (0.571) 
Duality -0.864 -0.486 
 (0.864) (0.724) 
Femalebrd 1.684** 1.083+ 
 (0.618) (0.563) 
Brdsize -0.171 0.913 
 (0.636) (0.637) 
Working capital -1.889** 2.117* 
 (0.630) (0.917) 
Industry dynamism 0.184 1.182* 
 (0.395) (0.557) 
Industry munificence -0.451 -1.745* 
 (0.414) (0.741) 
year -0.260 -0.343+ 
 (0.186) (0.193) 
CEO age -0.294 0.449 
 (0.422) (0.390) 
CEO tenure -0.838 -0.528 
 (0.880) (0.738) 
CEO incentive compensation 0.850+ -0.344 
 (0.459) (0.373) 
CEO ownership 1.018* 0.339 
 (0.500) (0.394) 
Inside Ceo 4.260 -1.846 
 (2.767) (2.311) 
CEO director -0.00187 0.0213 
 (0.234) (0.195) 
earnings_per_share 11.70*** -0.373 
 (2.607) (0.487) 
Firm size -0.995 1.695+ 
 (0.688) (0.872) 
Recall -1.308 -1.828 
 (2.170) (1.916) 
Prominence 1.591** -1.244+ 
 (0.590) (0.665) 
Strategic conformity squared  -3.607** 
  (1.389) 
roe -24.73***  
 (5.374)  
Constant 522.1 661.6+ 
 (374.6) (380.6) 
Observations 3,338 3,338 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
